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 The Effect of Transportation Subsidies on Urban Sprawl 
 
 Qing Su 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation investigates transportation subsidies as sources of urban sprawl. 
Apart from tolls, motorists do not pay highway user-fees, but they do pay gasoline taxes. 
Gasoline tax revenues are insufficient to cover the U.S. highway costs. Government, 
therefore, uses general tax revenues to cover highway expenditures. Since users do not 
pay the full cost of their travel, they have an incentive to travel longer commuting dis-
tances. Highway subsidies are, therefore, a potential contributor to urban sprawl. A simi-
lar argument applies to public transit. 
 To capture the effects of subsidized automobile and public transit travel, we ex-
tend the standard urban spatial single-mode model  (Brueckner, 1987) to incorporate pub-
lic subsidies for both one and two modes. Comparative static analysis of both models 
produces empirically testable hypotheses. Our most important theoretical result is that 
transit subsidies are inversely related to urban sprawl while auto subsidies are directly 
related to urban sprawl. 
 The empirical analysis focuses on tests of the two-mode model. For consistency 
with the monocentric assumption of our models, our sample consists of urbanized areas 
located within a single county and having only one central city. Spatial size of the urban-
ized area is the dependent variable. Following our theory, explanatory variables comprise 
the transit subsidy, the highway subsidy, number of households, agricultural land rent, 
     x
mean household income, and fixed and variable costs for transit and auto. We find that 
the spatial size of the urbanized area shrinks with an increase in the transit subsidy. The 
effect of highway subsidies, however, is ambiguous. We apply both ordinary least 
squares and two-stage least square regression analyses, and the results are qualitatively 
the same for both methods of estimation.
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 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 Urban sprawl is a topic that has generated much debate in recent years and has 
become an important policy issue in the United States. The term urban sprawl was first 
used in 1937 by Earle Draper, one of the first city planners in the southeastern United 
States (Black 1996). In the years since Draper introduced the term, popular concern with 
urban sprawl has continued and grown. In 1998, more than 150 ballot measures were in-
troduced to restrict urban sprawl in one way or another, and more than 85 percent of 
those measures were passed (Samuel 1998). By the year 2000, 14 states had adopted sub-
stantive land-use regulations to reduce urban sprawl (NARC 2000).  The purpose of this 
chapter is to define urban sprawl and to discuss its consequences and causes. 
1.1 What is urban sprawl? 
 Osborn (Williams 2000), the British advocate of city planning, who summarized 
the major debate of urban sprawl in the 1940s, describes urban sprawl as a type of urban 
growth that is economically wasteful and socially disadvantageous. It is economically 
wasteful because rising income and rapid transport induce people to move away from the 
central cities to suburbs where they find desirable residential surroundings at the expense 
of long and costly daily commutes. It is socially disadvantageous because local commu-
nity life is weakened or even destroyed, and access to the countryside is made more diffi-
cult for those people left in the central city (Nechyba and Walsh 2004).  Brueckner 
(2000) defines urban sprawl as excessive spatial expansion of cities. He notes that urban 
sprawl is a pejorative term in that it implies the normative judgment that urban growth is 
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excessive.  Mills (1999) prefers to use the non-pejorative term suburbanization to de-
scribe the phenomenon of continuous and unfettered urban growth in the United States. 
Nelson and Foster (1999) and Pendall (1999) define urban sprawl as unplanned, uncon-
trolled, and uncoordinated single-use development that does not provide a functional mix 
of uses and/or is not functionally related to surrounding land uses and which variously 
appears as low-density, ribbon or strip, scattered, leapfrog, or isolated development.  
 Generally, it is convenient to consider three different forms that urban sprawl can 
take. It may involve relatively low-density residential and employment areas coupled 
with low-density suburbanization at the urban fringe (Glaeser and Kahn 2003), planned 
communities that have their own “downtowns” perhaps located near a lake or park 
(Nechyba and Walsh 2004), or residences interspersed among rural areas.  
 There is no doubt that U.S. population has increasingly urbanized. The first cen-
sus in 1790 found 5 percent of U.S. population living in urban areas; by the 2000 census, 
nearly 80 percent did so (Williams 2000). In addition, the urban population has decentral-
ized, most notably since 1950, when nearly 70 percent of the population of urbanized ar-
eas lived in central cities while slightly over 30 percent lived in suburbs (Nechyba and 
Walsh 2004). The last half of the twentieth century has witnessed an accelerated growth 
of suburbs within the urban areas as Americans moved to new homes and shopping cen-
ters developed on the fringes of metropolitan areas. Even in areas of the country that have 
seen less dramatic population growth, urban sprawl has proceeded at a tremendous pace 
without letup. For instance, from 1990 to 1996, Little Rock, Arkansas, almost doubled its 
urban area from 109 to 199 square miles, while its population remained unchanged. Ak-
ron, Ohio, which had a population increase of only 3.5 percent, increased its urban area 
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by 65 percent in the same period. Austin, Texas, experienced a population increase of 50 
percent between 1990 and 1996 and expanded its urban area by 160 percent (Williams 
2000). 
 To most Americans, there is nothing particularly unusual about the sight of new 
housing developments with business and public facilities quickly going up around them. 
In the eyes of critics, however, this kind of real estate development represents an unrec-
ognized “silent crisis” in which America’s finite resources are wasted at unsustainable 
rates (Williams 2000). In recent years, an increasingly heated debate has been under way 
between advocates of private urban development in a free market and advocates of gov-
ernment regulations against urban sprawl. Before turning to the debate itself, we need to 
consider the consequences and causes of urban sprawl.  
1.2 Consequences of Urban Sprawl 
 Urban sprawl has several consequences that are widely criticized by economists. 
Generally speaking, so-called scattered, untimely, and unplanned urban development of-
ten occurs in urban fringe and rural areas, invading lands important to the environment 
for its open space and rich in natural resources (Nelson and Foster 1999, Brueckner 
2000).  Other consequences of urban sprawl are the dominance of the private automobiles 
for transportation and the large income disparities between city and suburbs (Downs 
1999, Brueckner 2000). Additionally, unfettered urban growth contributes to the decay of 
downtown areas, for it lowers developers’ incentive to redevelop land closer to the cen-
tral cities and lowers the tax base of central cities. 
 On the other hand, Gordon and Richardson (1997) argue that urban sprawl is a 
result of the fulfillment of consumer preferences. People choose to live in suburban areas, 
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thereby enjoying relatively lower land prices and larger amounts of living space, better 
schools for their children, a safer community, and better access to recreational facilities.  
 Although there are many alleged problems associated with urban sprawl, we focus 
on three that are widely criticized by both urban and public finance economists: traffic 
congestion, loss of open space, and income-level and racial segregation.  
1.2.1 Traffic Congestion 
 Empirical studies show that traffic congestion in the United States generates huge 
costs to urban residents. Shrank and Lomax (2003) find that the total increase in commut-
ing costs from congestion in 75 urban areas is $69.5 million, of which $60 million are 
time costs associated with longer commute time and $9.5 million are spent on additional 
fuel consumption resulting from congestion-induced decreases in transport efficiency. 
These figures translate into $520 per year for each resident in those urban areas. 
 Urban economists argue that peak-load taxes or toll roads are appropriate methods 
to internalize congestion externalities. Downs (1999) notes, however, that Americans 
may not be willing to incur the levels of congestion taxes that would be required to make 
a meaningful decrease in peak-hour traffic. Furthermore, the impact of congestion taxes 
on urban structure is not clear. Yinger (1993) argues that the imposition of congestion 
tolls or peak-load taxes would increase population density, thus reducing urban sprawl. 
On the other hand, Rufolo and Bianco (1998) argue that the internalization of congestion 
costs will lead to an increase in sprawl in the long run. They believe that the location de-
cisions of both businesses and households are endogenous in the long run. Congestion 
pricing would raise commuting costs from suburbs to the CBD but not commuting costs 
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between suburbs. This disparity, they contend, will induce a decentralization of activity 
and further increase urban sprawl. 
 Another issue associated with congestion is air pollution. According to the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency’s National Emission Inventory, in 2001, on-road vehi-
cles in the United States accounted for 37 percent of total nitrogen oxides (a major con-
tributor to the formation of ground-level ozone, particulate matter, haze, and acid rain), 
27 percent of volatile organic compounds (which react with nitrogen oxides to form 
ground-level ozone), and 62 percent of total emissions of carbon monoxide (a particular 
threat for individuals who suffer from cardiovascular disease). Between 1970 and 2001, 
total vehicle miles traveled increased 151 percent from 1.1 trillion miles to 2.8 trillion 
miles. Over the same period, miles traveled by passenger cars and motorcycles increased 
by over 75 percent from 920 billion miles to 1.63 trillion (Federal Highway Administra-
tion, 2004). 
 Empirical studies yield no strong results on the link between air pollution and ur-
ban sprawl. The majority of the empirical studies claiming to document a clear link be-
tween density and pollution fail to account for other important variables such as income 
and household demographics (Nechyba and Walsh, 2003). Those studies that use micro-
level data and attempt to control for these other factors generally conclude that the rela-
tionship between density and travel behavior is weaker and less certain than is often 
claimed in the popular press (Crane, 2001).  Glaeser and Kahn (2003) also point out that 
U.S. urban air pollution has been on the decline since the 1970s, with more newer, 
cleaner cars replacing older polluting cars. 
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1.2.2  Loss of Open Space 
 Loss of open space is often identified as one of the key problems associated with 
sprawl. According to Burchfield, et al. (2003), land area in urban areas increased by 47.7 
percent between 1976 and 1992, an annualized rate of 2.48 percent. As the authors point 
out, however, these numbers can be misleading because, although urbanization is increas-
ing rapidly, only 1.92 percent of the entire U.S. land area as of 1992 is urbanized. Given 
this fact, why is the loss of open space receiving such prominence in the debate over 
sprawl? 
 Empirical studies by public finance economists suggest that open space within 
suburbs is significantly more important to households than open space at the urban fringe. 
Their work shows that housing prices are positively related to open space, such as public 
parks, privately owned open space, and the natural land cover immediately surrounding 
household locations. Geoghegan, et al. (1997) find that housing prices increase with the 
percentage of open space within a 0.1-kilometer ring surrounding a house and decrease 
with the percentage of open space within a 1-kilometer ring surrounding the house. 
Acharya and Bennett (2001) find that housing prices increase with the percentage of open 
space at a decreasing rate within both a quarter-mile and a 1-mile radius.  The evidence 
seems to suggest that households prefer open space in the immediate vicinity of their 
residence but they do not place great value on open space on the urban fringe. Nechyba 
and Walsh (2003) argue that open space is a local public good. The more local the nature 
of the open space amenities and the larger the scale of development, the stronger will be 
the incentives for developers to provide efficient levels of open space. 
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1.2.3  Income-Level and Racial Segregation 
 Generally speaking, people’s ability to move out of central cities into suburbs and 
their ability to choose among suburbs are not uniform across races and income groups. 
Within U.S. urbanized areas, the poor generally live in central cities while middle-income 
and high-income individuals live in suburbs (Mieszkowski and Mills, 1993; Glaeser, et 
al., 2000). Glaeser et al., (2000) suggest that for those using public transit, the auto-
centered suburbs may simply not be a choice. In addition, politically created distortions 
through zoning leads to further segregation based on income and race (Glaeser et al., 
2000). The geographic segregation and lower mobility of poorer households are very 
likely to result in a variety of social problems in poor areas (Glaeser and Kahn, 2003). 
 In the case of education, for example, it is well known that public school quality 
differs across neighborhoods and districts even when observable school inputs such as 
per pupil spending are equalized (Vigdor and Nechyba, 2003).    Analogously equalized 
spending on public safety does not lead to equal levels of protection from crime, nor does 
equal public investment in basic infrastructure result in uniformly functional neighbor-
hoods (Katz et al., 2001). In all these cases, the level of the public good depends critically 
on the characteristics of the local population that is being served by public expenditures 
on the good.  Bayer, McMillan, and Reuben (2002) argue that housing markets, employ-
ment centers, and preferences for residential homogeneity rather than differences in tastes 
for quality of education represent the crucial explanatory forces for the racial school seg-
regation patterns observed in the United States. This result highlights the fact that urban 
economies arise from a blend of decisions about housing, employments, schooling, and 
neighborhood and of public and private institutions that shape each of these decisions. 
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Further research on the impact of urban sprawl on neighborhoods within cities is there-
fore necessary.  
 Given the alleged consequences of urban sprawl, public officials and others seek 
ways of controlling it; knowledge of what causes urban sprawl is therefore important in 
designing measures to control it. 
1.3 What Causes Urban Sprawl? 
 Why has urban development in the United States followed such patterns of subur-
banization? Two groups of economists attempt to explain this trend. Public finance 
economists focus on the role of households’ preferences for local taxes and amenities on 
households’ location decisions.  Urban economists emphasize the role of population 
growth, rising income, and lower transportation costs with contributing forces from gov-
ernment regulations and taxation, including federal tax and local government zoning 
policies.  
1.3.1 Local Public Finance Model 
 The local public finance model stems from Tiebout’s “voting with one’s feet” the-
ory in 1956 (Tiebout 1956). Tiebout shows that local public goods could be provided 
without resort to politicians. Instead of voting for politicians who would then set expendi-
tures and taxes, households vote with their feet to select the community that happens to 
offer the right level of public goods. In other words, people sort themselves into different 
local jurisdictions based on their preferences for local public goods. 
 These sorting effects are divided into two broad categories for purpose of our 
study of urban sprawl: those that pull people out of central cities because of attractive 
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features of suburban areas and those that push people out of central cities because of in-
ner city decay (Nechyba and Strauss, 1998, Nechyba and Walsh, 2004).  
 The pull side of the public finance model emphasizes a group of households with 
similar preferences willing to pay for the provision of local public goods in a suburb. 
These like-minded households form a new community. People are attracted to the new 
community from the central city because they can enjoy some features they desire, such 
as a high-quality school system, low crime rate, a reasonable tax rate, and clean streets. 
When combined with zoning policies enacted by local government, people in the new 
community could exclude those who are considered to create negative fiscal externalities, 
thus avoiding the free-rider problem (Fischel 2001) 
 Carruthers and Ulfarsson (2002) identify another possible contributor to urban 
sprawl, namely, governmental fragmentation, which falls under the category of the pull 
side of the public finance model.  They argue that political fragmentation contributes to 
urban sprawl through Tiebout mechanisms. That is, in metropolitan areas, households 
choose locations that offer a desirable combination of amenities at a price they can af-
ford. The price of entry is given by the cost of housing and the property tax. This plays an 
important role in forcing residents to balance their preferences and their budget con-
straints.  Since real estate markets in most metropolitan areas are highly segmented, po-
tential residents can easily be priced out. Consequently, growth at the urban fringe in-
creases because land prices there are comparatively low. Empirical evidence reveals that 
fragmentation is associated with lower densities and higher property values but has no 
direct effect on public service expenditures. This suggests that fragmentation may be a 
possible cause of urban sprawl. 
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 The push side of the public finance model focuses on inner city problems. Rela-
tively high-income people are forced to leave the central city because of inner city prob-
lems such as a high crime rate, a high tax rate, lower quality schools, and general fiscal 
distress within the central city. With more people leaving the central city, those remain-
ing face higher and higher tax rates. With the decrease in tax revenues, the local govern-
ment experiences fiscal distress. As a result, public goods provision deteriorates, e.g., the 
crime rate increases and school quality decreases. Thus, people leave the central cities not 
because of attractive features in suburbs but to avoid inner city problems. There is some 
empirical support for this view (Cullen and Levitt 1999). 
 The empirical studies on sorting effects and urban sprawl mainly involve racial 
segregation. The results are, however, inconclusive. Some researchers believe that mi-
norities are segregated in central cities because of their relatively lower income and ex-
clusionary suburban policies. Yinger (1993) finds that urban development and racial seg-
regation are positively related. Bayer et al., (2002) find that households tend to reside 
close to others with similar race and ethnicity, which suggests that urban sprawl may con-
tribute to racial segregation. Some researchers argue, however, that with the spatial ex-
pansion of urban areas and increase in income, an emerging minority middle class has 
appeared that can afford to move to suburbs, thus decreasing racial segregation. Glaeser 
and Kahn (2003) find that fast growing urbanized areas have experienced a sharper de-
cline in racial segregation than have other areas.  
 In conclusion, public finance economists have explored the connection between 
urban sprawl and Tiebout sorting.  Both push and pull sorting play an important role in 
determining household residential location decisions. The public finance economists, 
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however, fail to answer a key question, that is, whether Tiebout sorting is the cause or the 
consequence of urban sprawl. 
1.3.2 Urban Economic Theories on Urban Sprawl 
 Much of our understanding of urban growth can be derived from the “monocen-
tric urban model,” early developers of which are Alonso (1964), Mills (1967), and Muth 
(1969). This model finds three fundamental forces responsible for spatial growth of cit-
ies: population growth, rising real income, and lower real transport costs.  Population 
growth and rising real income increase the demand for housing. Since land prices de-
crease with distance from the city center, people choose housing in the suburbs, which 
causes the city to expand spatially. Lower real transport costs are largely due to highways 
that enable people to travel faster and cheaper, while facilitating suburban living.  
 Glaeser and Kahn (2003) identify automobiles and their accompanying lower 
transportation costs as the primary catalyst of sprawling cities through much of the twen-
tieth century.  By 1910, car registrations in the United States had exceeded 500,000 
(Nechyba and Walsh 2004), and in 1920, it reached eight million. By 1952, a majority of 
households in America owned at least one car (Glaeser and Kahn (2003). In 1960, 64 
percent of commuters drove to work, growing to 78 percent in 1978, 84 percent in 1980, 
and 88 percent in 2000 (Center of Urban Transportation Research, 2003). It is hard to 
imagine urban sprawl without the rise of the automobile. Although Mills (1969) finds 
suburbanization occurring as far back as 1890, the concern with urban sprawl is a fairly 
recent phenomenon. 
 The monocentric model also predicts that rising incomes contribute to decreasing 
population densities in cities if the income elasticity of demand for housing is greater 
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than the income elasticity of marginal commuting costs. Margo (1992) suggests that as 
much as a 50 percent increase in suburbanization between 1950 and 1980 could be ex-
plained by rising incomes. Brueckner and Fansler (1983) find that a 1 percent increase in 
income results in a 1.5 percent increase in the spatial size of urban areas. 
   The real question is whether or not the spatial expansion of cities is excessive.  In 
other words, do free markets allocate resources efficiently in urban areas or do market 
failures result in inefficient resources allocation? Brueckner (2000) identifies three mar-
ket failures that may lead to excessive spatial growth of cities. The first involves the so-
cial value of open space.  During the process of suburbanization, open space near the city 
fringe is converted to urban use. People living in suburban areas do not, however, shoul-
der the full cost of loss of the social value of the open space. This market failure results in 
over-conversion of rural land into urban uses. The second market failure concerns com-
muting. Commuters bear only the cost of vehicle operation and their time as well as the 
average cost of congestion and pollution, but not the costs of congestion and air pollution 
they impose on others. Consequently, the cost of commuting is underpaid. As a result, 
households choose to live farther away from CBD than socially desirable. The third mar-
ket failure concerns public infrastructure cost generated by new development at the urban 
fringe. When new living areas are built, public infrastructure, such as roads, sewer sys-
tems, schools, and recreation centers, are needed. In the U.S., most infrastructure costs 
are paid through the property tax, which results in homeowners with equal assessed val-
ues in low- and high-density areas paying the same amount. That is, households’ private 
costs are only the average infrastructure costs, which may be less than the marginal costs 
they generate. This also means that residents living in high-density areas subsidize those 
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living in low-density areas, generally found in suburbs. Perversely, in most urban areas, 
this means poor people subsidize rich people who live in suburban areas. As a result of 
the failure to fully charge for suburban infrastructure costs, developers can bid higher 
prices for the undeveloped land than would otherwise be the case, thus converting more 
rural land into urban use, contributing to urban sprawl (Mills 1978, Brueckner 2000). 
 The effects of these three market failures are exacerbated by public policies such 
as land-use planning, which often creates situations where regulations are more restrictive 
in some areas than in others. As a result, new development is built in less restrictive areas 
generally located near the urban fringe.  
 Many public policies have been suggested as potential contributors to urban 
sprawl. For example, Jackson (1985) argues that urban developments have been greatly 
affected by the New Deal’s creation of the Home Owners Loan Corporation and the Fed-
eral Housing Administration (FHA) to provide decent housing for poorer Americans. 
Williams (2000) identifies generous mortgage insurance and loan programs through the 
FHA and the Veterans Administration (VA) as potential contributors to urban sprawl.  
The FHA provides federal guarantees to private mortgage lenders, lowering the minimum 
down payment to just 10 percent for homebuyers, and payback periods are extended to 20 
or 30 years. The VA offers low-interest mortgages without down payment to all qualified 
veterans. The federal income tax allows deductions for mortgage interest and property 
tax. All of these public policies worked to generate a massive expansion of suburban 
growth after 1945. 
 Brueckner and Kim (2003) explore the connection between urban spatial expan-
sion and the property tax. The property tax is levied at equal rates on land and improve-
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ments. However, the portion levied on land has quite different effects from the portion 
levied on improvements. The property tax on land, as generally acknowledged, cannot be 
shifted and therefore is a neutral tax in that it has no effect on resource allocation. The 
underlying reason is that land is in fixed supply. A property tax on improvements, on the 
other hand, is not generally regarded as neutral. Such a tax tends to lower the equilibrium 
level of improvements chosen by the developer. Thus, land is developed less intensively 
under the property tax, which may contribute to the spatial expansion of cities. 
 Brueckner and Kim show that while the tax’s depressive effect on improvements 
reduces population density, spurring the spatial expansion of cities, a countervailing ef-
fect from lower dwelling sizes may dominate, raising densities and making cities shrink. 
Numerical examples suggest that the property tax may encourage urban sprawl. Based on 
their findings, Brueckner and Kim suggest that the distortions generated by the property 
tax may include inefficient spatial expansion of cities. 
 Other papers dealing with the issue generate mixed results.  Sullivan (1985) ana-
lyzes the spatial effect of the property tax using a model including both business and 
residential property. In view of the complexity of the model, however, the linkage be-
tween the property tax and urban growth is not clearly identified.  Arnott and MacKinnon 
(1977a) undertake a general equilibrium simulation of the spatial effects of the property 
tax and find that if there is an increase in the property tax, the city shrinks as a response. 
Pasha and Ghaus (1995) note, however, that this result might not hold in a more general 
model. 
 Persky and Kurban (2003) identify federal spending as a possible contributor to 
urban sprawl. They consider the influence on urban expansion of recent federal subsidies 
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in Chicago. They believe that federal spending influences metropolitan expansion in at 
least three ways. First, subsidies can change the relative price of land and other goods at 
the urban fringe, which induces consumers to substitute land for other goods. Second, 
federal programs or subsidies can increase people’s disposable income by reducing their 
need for local government or private spending, which increases the demand for living 
space. The last factor Persky and Kurban discuss concerns the employment opportunities 
generated by federal spending, which in turn influences employees’ residential locations. 
Specifically, if federal spending is dispersed rather than concentrated, it may encourage 
urban sprawl. They find that in Chicago federal spending aimed at alleviating poverty and 
supporting the elderly strongly stimulates land absorption in suburban areas. They esti-
mate that residential land use in the outer ring of the Chicago area has been increased by 
20 percent as a result of federal spending.  They also believe that the income tax subsidy 
for housing has a larger effect on urban sprawl in Chicago than federal spending. This is 
consistent with the findings of James and Lin (1991), who suggest that the federal tax 
subsidy for housing may be a possible cause of urban sprawl. 
 Brueckner (2004) identifies transportation subsidies as another contributor to ur-
ban sprawl. According to economic theory, individuals’ transportation and location deci-
sions would be efficient if the price paid for transportation closely matched the costs in-
curred by the user. Although users do not pay a direct fee every time they use a highway, 
they do pay a user-fee in the form of the gasoline tax. Revenues from gasoline taxes have, 
however, been insufficient to cover the construction, maintenance, and administration of 
highways. Various levels of government must use general tax revenues to augment high-
way expenditures, which indicates that governments provide highway subsidies to users. 
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Given the fact that users do not pay the full cost of their travel, they have an incentive to 
travel longer and more often. Highway subsidies not only foster increased travel and con-
gestion, they also contribute to urban sprawl. Suburban areas traversed by new highways 
tend to attract residents because transportation is improved while the full costs of the con-
struction are not borne by those who benefit.  
 User-fees only covered 68 percent of the highway systems’ capital and mainte-
nance costs during the period 1956-1986 (Voith 1989). The share of total highway ex-
penditure covered by user-fees has fluctuated considerably over time and across regions. 
Voith (1989) examines thirteen major highway construction projects ranging in cost from 
$97 million to $581 million. The cost of construction varies widely, from a low of $6.8 
million per mile to a high of $133.3 million per mile. None of the projects generates suf-
ficient user-fees to cover the infrastructure investment. As a matter of fact, user-fees cov-
ers 54 percent of the investment at best and 2.5 percent at worst. On a per-car basis, the 
subsidy ranges from $0.16 to $4.50. On a vehicle-mile-traveled basis, the subsidy ranges 
from less than 1 cent per vehicle to 41 cents (Voith 1989). 
1.4 Summary 
 This chapter has defined urban sprawl and discussed some of its consequences 
and causes. Although there are many potential causes of urban sprawl, in this dissertation, 
we concentrate on one: subsidized transportation. In Ch. 2, we modify the monocentric 
model to suit our purpose by introducing transportation subsidies into a single-mode 
model; in Ch. 3, we do the same for a two-mode model.  Ch. 4 presents empirical analy-
sis, including research hypotheses, data sources, estimation methods, and estimation re-
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sults. Ch. 5 contains a discussion of the research findings, focusing on policy recommen-
dations.
  
 
 CHAPTER 2 SINGLE-MODE URBAN SPATIAL MODEL 
 We now present our theory of the relationship between urban sprawl and govern-
mental transportation subsidies. We begin with some definitions and assumptions fol-
lowed by a detailed discussion of the behavioral equations of the model.  Finally, overall 
equilibrium conditions of the urban area are provided. Following standard practice in ur-
ban economics since Mills (1972), we use the term urban area to refer to the legal city 
and its suburbs which may or may not be part of the legal city. 
2.1 Definitions and Assumptions 
 The basic framework employed is the Muth-Mills urban residential land use 
model exposited by Brueckner (1987). 
 The following notation is used: 
 y = an urban household’s money income, including both wage and non-wage in-
come 
 c = quantity of an urban household’s expenditures on all commodities except 
housing and transportation 
 q = quantity of housing service consumed by an urban household 
 p = price per unit of housing service 
 t = money travel cost per round-trip mile 
 α = proportion of money travel cost per round-trip mile paid by household 
(0 1)α< <  
 x = distance from home to CBD 
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  u = utility indicator  
 θ = local tax rate  
 N = capital, an input to housing production 
 l = land, an input to housing production 
 r = rent per acre of land, the price (rental rate) of the land input 
 i = interest rate, the price (rental rate) of the capital input 
 L= population of the urban area 
 ra = agricultural land rent at the urban area’s boundary 
 x = urban area boundary 
 β = proportion of urban-area tax revenue used for transportation subsidies, which 
we refer to as the tax-share variable 
 G= intergovernmental grants used for transportation 
 The urban area is located on a featureless plain containing a central business dis-
trict (CBD) to which every urban resident travels for work, shopping, and leisure activi-
ties. The urban area has two sectors: consumption and production. Consumers choose the 
quantity of housing service and other expenditures based on their preferences and budget 
constraints. Housing service is produced using two inputs, capital and land. 
 All urban residents earn the same exogenously determined income and possess 
the same utility function defined over housing and the composite good, whose price we 
normalize. An urban resident’s utility function is strictly quasi-concave, and housing ser-
vice is assumed to be a normal good. Although local governments generally do not levy 
income tax, we assume local tax revenues from property taxes and sales taxes are propor-
tional to income, therefore, local tax revenues are θy. 
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 Housing service, q, as originally defined by Muth (1969), captures all characteris-
tics of a dwelling unit and the land on which it is located except location. We recognize 
that housing is a multi-attribute commodity with such characteristics as floor space, num-
ber of bedrooms, etc., and that households may have preferences for these attributes. The 
assumption of a single variable representing service from a dwelling unit, however, con-
siderably simplifies the analysis and has been used since it was introduced by Muth. 
Housing price, p, is the price per unit of housing service. For simplicity, we often refer to 
q as square feet of floor space and to p as the price (rental rate) per square foot. There is 
no distinction between ownership and rental of housing. If a household owns its house, 
housing price is the implicit cost of a unit of housing service. The quantity pq, therefore, 
is the observable or imputed rental value of a dwelling unit. We assume single-person 
households, so that the number of households equals the population of the urban area. 
 Assumptions concerning transportation deal with the transportation system, travel 
cost, and the travel subsidy. Urban residents only travel between home and the CBD. The 
transportation system is sufficiently developed to allow straight-line travel. We begin by 
assuming a single transportation mode, or alternatively, a single mode-combination, such 
as auto travel to a transit station. Later, we incorporate mode choice. 
 The urban area residents’ private travel cost per round trip mile,αt, is less than the 
total travel cost per round trip mile, t, because urban area government spending on trans-
portation is higher than fees collected from residents. In other words, we assume gov-
ernment gives commuters a subsidy of (1 – α)t per round trip mile of travel. This assump-
tion has empirical support. In the United States, only around 38 percent of transit operat-
ing costs and 25 percent of combined operating and capital costs of transit systems are 
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covered by the total fares collected from users. For highway systems, around 60 percent 
of highway disbursements are covered by gas taxes and other user-fees (Brueckner 2003).  
 In this model, households’ private travel cost is proportional to distance traveled, 
which implies that the urban transport system exhibits constant returns to scale. Although 
some empirical evidence suggests that transportation systems, such as bus or rail, exhibit 
increasing return to scale, the increasing returns in those systems may stem from the exis-
tence of underutilized capacity. Passenger-miles could be increased with little cost by 
simply filling half-empty buses or rail cars with additional riders. But this possibility im-
plies that the original capacity of the system was too large. If system capacity is instead 
adjusted to match demand, then costs should increase roughly in step with passenger-
miles. Adding a passenger-mile means adding a seat mile, which involves a constant ad-
ditional cost (Brueckner 2004).
2.2 Demand Side of Housing Market 
 We start our analysis from the demand side of the housing market. The house-
hold’s utility function is V(c,q), where c is expenditure on non-housing, non-
transportation goods and q is housing consumption. The price of the composite good 
(normalized to unity) is the same everywhere within the urban area, but housing price 
varies with location. Given the assumption that all urban residents have identical prefer-
ences, urban spatial equilibrium implies the same level of satisfaction, u, for all residents. 
The equilibrating factor is housing price so that those living far from the CBD and there-
fore paying a large transportation cost are compensated with a lower housing price, while 
those living close to the CBD pay a higher housing price. Households face a budget con-
straint represented by y = c + pq + θy + αtx. This budget constraint tells us that urban 
 residents’ income is spent on the composite good, housing, urban-area taxes, and trans-
portation.  
 Solving the budget constraint for c and substituting that into the utility function, 
the household’s problem is to maximize 
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with respect to q. This maximization problem produces the following first-order condi-
tion 
 [ ][ ]21
(1 ) ,
(1 ) ,
V y tx pq q
p
V y tx pq q
θ α
θ α
− − − =− − −  (2.2) 
where subscripts denote partial differentiation with respect to the first and second argu-
ments of the utility function. Equation (2.2) is the familiar condition that the marginal 
rate of substitution equals the price ratio where MRS
V
V ≡
1
2 , and, because of normaliza-
tion, the price ratio is p. 
 All households must have the same utility for spatial equilibrium, so we have the 
equation: 
 [ ](1 ) ,V y tx pq qθ α− − − = u  (2.3) 
where u is the urban-area-wide utility level in spatial equilibrium. 
 The simultaneous system composed of (2.2) and (2.3) yields solutions for the en-
dogenous variables p and q as functions of exogenous variables x, y, t, α, u and θ. Totally 
differentiating (2.3), we have 
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Given V1p =V2, from (2.2), we have 
 αααθθ txdVxdtVtdxVydVdyVduqdpV 111111 )1( ++++−−=−  (2.4) 
From (2.4), we derive 
 0<−=∂
∂
q
t
x
p α  (2.5) 
 Housing price is a decreasing function of distance from the CBD. Given that u is 
constant for change in all other exogenous variables, we derive the effect of x on q as fol-
lows 
 0<∂
∂
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂=∂
∂
x
p
p
q
x
q
u
,  
where ( )/ uq p∂ ∂ denotes the Hicksian demand slope. 
 The explanation of the spatial behavior of p and q is simple. Urban residents liv-
ing farther away from the CBD are compensated by lower housing price for their higher 
travel cost. Since housing service is a normal good, the decrease of housing price with 
distance from the CBD leads to more consumption of housing service, or larger dwell-
ings. 
 The other parameters’ influences on housing price and housing service are de-
rived below because they play a very important role in the comparative static analysis 
presented in the next section. 
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The influence 
(2.4) as follows 
 of income on housing price and housing service is determined from 
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 The influence of money cost of travel on p and q is determined from (2.4) as fol-
lows 
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consumption is derived from (2.4) as follows 
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The influence of the urban-area tax rate on housing price and housing cons
tion is derived from (2.4) as follows 
 ump-
q
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The influence of the utility level on 
derived from (2.4) as follows 
 
 housing price and housing consumption is 
01
1∂
∂
qVu
p <−=  (2.10) 
  We cannot determine /q y∂ ∂ by the method previously used, however, because u 
is now varying. Brueckner (1987, p. 825, n.6) provides the result as 
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In this model, /q y∂ ∂ cannot be used to define a normal good because utility is held fixed. 
Instead, following Wheaton (1974) and Brueckner (1987), we assume /qcMRS c∂ ∂  > 0 as 
the definition of a normal good. This implies that indifference curves become steeper as c 
increases holding q constant. Coupled with the concavity of indifference curves (which 
follows from the assumption of strict quasi-concavity of the utility function), this as-
pti he resulting decrease in p produces an increase 
 q. 
 ca
sum on ensures that when u increases, t
in
2.3 Supply Side of Housing Market 
 We now turn to the supply side of the housing market. Housing is produced with 
two inputs land, l, and pital, N. The production function, ),( lNHH = , is strictly con-
cave and exhibits constant returns to scale. We assume positive marginal products, 
namely, 0>lH , 0>NH .  Strict concavity implies that the marginal products of capital 
and land diminish, which is supported by the fact that as the height of a building in-
creases, more and more non-land input is consumed in non-productive uses such as foun-
dations, elevators, and stairways. 
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r, we refer to S as structural density.  It is an index of the height of a building. 
tion exhibits constant returns to scale, we rewrite it as 
follows: 
 
 To simplify notation, let S denote the capital-land ratio, N/l, and, following 
Brueckne
Since the housing production func
)1,(1, SH
l
NH ⎞⎛H
l
=⎟⎠⎜⎝= or )(SlhH =  
A housing producer’s profit is 
 ))(( riSSphl −−=π  (2.11) 
here 
The produ
 (2.12) 
w r is urban land rent per acre and i is the interest rate or rental rate per unit of capi-
tal.  
 cer determines S to maximize profit per acre of land, and the first-order 
condition for profit maximization is given as 
iShp =′ )( 
In long-run competitive equilibrium, land rent must absorb profit, so that  
 ( )ph S iS r− =  (2.13) 
re functions of these same variables as well as the rental price per unit 
f capi ant 
role in our model. 
This constitutes the spatial equilibrium condition for housing production, i.e., housing 
producers earn the same profit everywhere in the area. 
 By (2.4), we know that housing price is a function of distance, x; income, y; 
money travel cost, t; private share of commuting cost, α; tax rate θ; and the spatial equi-
librium utility level, u. From (2.12) and (2.13), it is clear that the capital-land ratio, S, and 
urban land rent, r, a
o tal, i. In what follows, we suppress the variables θ and i as they play no import
     27
Totally differentiat
 
 ing (2.12) and (2.13) with respect to ϕ = x, y, t, u, α, yields 
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Equation (2.14), upon rearrangement, becomes 
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From (2.16) and (2.17), we have the following results 
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 From (2.18), we see that both urban land rent and the capital-land ratio are de-
creasing function of distance from the CBD. These results are consistent with observa-
tions that in the CBD land rents are higher and buildings are taller than in suburban areas. 
In our model, lower land rent compensates housing producers for lower housing price 
farther away from the CBD. As a result, housing produced farther from 
hShr
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q
hxt
α
r
θθ  (2.18) 
the CBD uses 
less capital per unit of land, leading to shorter buildings in suburban areas. 
 Another variable of importance in the comparative static analysis is urban popula-
tion density. Under our assumption of single-person households, urban population density 
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onsumer choice over housing service and producer decisions over hous-
.4 
 the city boundary,
is D=h(S)/q. Population density is a decreasing function of distance from the CBD be-
cause ∂S/∂x < 0 and ∂q/∂x > 0.  Much empirical evidence supports this result (e.g., Muth 
(1969)). Households living farther from the CBD live in larger dwelling units and shorter 
buildings than those living close to the CBD. Thus fewer and fewer people fit on each 
acre of land the farther from the CBD they live. Declining population density is the com-
bined result of c
ing production. 
2 Overall Equilibrium of Urban Area 
 To complete the model, we need three equilibrium conditions. The first one is the 
boundary condition, which requires housing producers to outbid agricultural users for all 
urban land used in housing production. At  x , urban land rent equals 
gricultural land rent, ra.  Ta his condition is 
 a)  ( r, y, t, u,xr =α  (2.19) 
 The second condition states that the urban population must exactly fit inside the 
urban area. Let δ represent the number of radians of land available for housing at distance 
, where 0 < δ < 2π. The populatx ion condition is 
 
0
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 Transportation spending by government exceeds the fees collected from commut-
ers. In addition, the part of transportation investment not covered by user-fees is covered 
om urban residents and by intergovernmental grants.  
he balanced budget condition is 
 
by part of the local tax collected fr
T
2
0
(1 ) ( )
x
yL G tx D x, y,t,u,α dxβθ α δ+ = − ∫  (2.21) 
 where the left-hand side is urban-area taxes and intergovernmental grants used to cover 
the subsidized portion of urban-area transportation costs, which is the right-hand side. 
 The interpretation of the urban equilibrium conditions depends on whether or not 
the city is a closed city or open city. A closed city is one in which population migration 
does not occur, so population, L, is exogenous but utility, u, is endogenous. An open city 
is one in which population migration occurs, so population is endogenous and utility is 
exogenous. We adopt the closed-city formulation. 
 In summary, for a closed city, the single mode urban spatial model is composed of 
the following equations. 
Consumption sector 
 [ ][ ]21
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(1 ) ,
V y tx pq q
p
V y tx pq q
θ α
θ α
− − − =− − −  (2.22) 
 [ ](1 ) ,V y tx pq qθ α− − − = u  (2.23) 
Equations (2.22) and (2.23) imply that  
 ),,,,( αtuyxpp =           
 ),,,,( αtuyxqq =         
Production sector 
  (2.24) iShp =′ )(
 ( )ph S iS r− =  (2.25) 
Equations (2.24), together with (2.22), (2.23), and (2.25) imply that 
 ),,,,( tuyxSS α=        
 =r ),,,,( tuyxr α   
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 Urban boundary 
 ar,y,t,u, αxr( =)  (2.26) 
Urban population 
 
0
)
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Balanced budget condition 
 2
0
(1 ) )
x
yL G tx D(x, y, t, u, α dxβθ α+ = − ∫  (2.28) 
 In a closed city model, the equilibrium conditions (2.26), (2.27), and (2.28) con-
stitute simultaneous equations that determine equilibrium values for utility, the urban 
boundary, and the tax-share variable, or  
 ),,,( ,αartyLxx =  
 ),,,( ,αartyLuu =      
 ),,,( ,αββ artyL=  
2.5 Comparative Static Analysis of Single-Mode Urban Spatial Model 
 This section provides a comparative static analysis of the single-mode urban spa-
tial model presented above. We begin by totally differentiating the three urban equilib-
rium conditions. This enables us to derive the effect of L, y, ra, t, α on the urban area 
boundary, x spatial equilibrium utility level, u, and the tax-share variableβ. We then de-
rive the effect of the exogenous variables on the remaining endogenous variables, 
namely, p, q, r, and S. Some variables, such y, t, andα, have both a direct effect on p, q, r, 
and S as well as an indirect effect through the endogenous utility. Other variables have 
only an indirect effects. The comparative static analysis provided in this section follows 
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 Brueckner (1987) except for adding the variable α and a balanced-budget equation for 
transportation subsidies. Many of our results are identical to those obtained by Brueckner. 
Since our main goal is to explore the relationship between transportation subsidies and 
urban sprawl, our comparative static analysis focuses on the effects of the relevant ex-
ogenous variables L, y, ra, t, α, while neglecting the variables θ, G, δ, and i. 
 Before presenting our comparative static analysis, we summarize those results 
obtained earlier that are used in this section.  
 
q
th
x
r
q
t
x
p αα −=∂
∂−=∂
∂        (2.29) 
 ( )11       hp r
y q y q
θθ −∂ − ∂= =∂ ∂  (2.30) 
 
q
xh
t
r
q
x
t
p αα −=∂
∂−=∂
∂       (2.31) 
 
q
hxtr
q
xtp −=∂
∂−=∂
∂
αα       (2.32) 
 0      <−=∂
∂−=∂
∂
q
hyr
q
yp
θθ  (2.33) 
 
1
1
qVu
p −=∂
∂   
1
0r h
u qV
∂ = − <∂  (2.34) 
 ϕϕ ∂
∂
′′
′−=∂
∂ p
hp
hS  (where ,,,,, tyux αϕ = ) (2.35) 
 arxr( =)  (2.36) 
 ∫ =x LdxqShx0 )(δ  (2.37) 
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  ∫−=+ x dxqShtxGyL 0 2 )()1( αβθ  (2.38) 
 The goal of the analysis is to deduce the impact of changes in L, ra, y, t, and espe-
cially α on the size of the urban area, x  housing price, p, land rent, r, dwelling size, q, 
structural density, S, utility level, u, and the tax-share variables, β.  
2.5.1 Effects of Change in Population 
2.5.1.1 Effect of Population on Utility 
 Recall that population density is defined as /D h q= . From (2.29) and (2.32) we 
have 
t
x
r
q
hD α
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−
== . Given this result, (2.37) is rewritten as 
 
0
x rx dx
x
tLα
δ
∂− =∂∫  (2.39) 
Integrating by parts, where u = x and dv = 
0
x r dx
x
∂
∂∫ , we have 
 0 0
xx tLxr rdx αδ− + =∫ , or (2.40) 
 
0
x
a
tLxr rdx αδ− + =∫ (since arxr =)(  ) (2.41) 
Totally differentiating (2.41) with respect to λ = L, ra, y, t, α, we have 
 
0
xa
a a
L tt L tLrx r r u xr x dx r
u
αα αλ λ
λ λ λ λ λ δ
λ
∂ ∂ ∂+ +∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎛ ⎞ ∂ ∂ ∂− − + + + =⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠∫  (2.42) 
After rearranging (2.42), we obtain  
 
0
x a
L tt L tL rr r u dx x
u
αα αλ λ λ
λ λ δ λ
∂ ∂ ∂+ + ∂∂ ∂ ∂⎛ ⎞ ∂ ∂ ∂+ = +⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠∫  (2.43) 
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 or, since u is not a function of x 
 
0 0
x x a
L tt L tL rr u rdx dx x
u
αα αλ λ λ
λ λ δ λ
∂ ∂ ∂+ + ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂+ = +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∫ ∫  
Then solving for /u λ∂ ∂ , we have 
 0
0
x
a
x
rt L L t tL rx dxu
r dx
u
α α α
δ λ δ λ δ λ λ λ
λ
∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂+ + + −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= ∂∂
∂
∫
∫
 (2.44) 
 When λ = L, (2.44) becomes 
 0
0
x
x
t r dxu L
rL dx
u
α
δ
∂−∂ ∂= ∂∂
∂
∫
∫
 (2.45) 
From (2.34) 0. 
1
<−=∂
∂
qV
h
u
r  We see that
0
0
x r dx
u
∂ <∂∫ , and because   0=∂∂Lr  
 
0
  0
x
t
u
rL dx
u
α
δ∂ = ∂∂
∂∫
<  (2.46) 
2.5.1.2 Effect of Population on Urban Area Boundary 
 Totally differentiating (2.36), we have 
 λλλλ ∂
∂=∂
∂+∂
∂
∂
∂+∂
∂
∂
∂ arru
u
rx
x
r
 (2.47) 
where bars mean the function is evaluated at x . By rearranging the terms of (2.47), we 
have    
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λ  (2.48) 
ecall from (2.29) that 
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0  and   ,0   ,0 =∂
∂<∂<∂ LLu , we have Because 
∂∂ rur
 0>∂x∂L  (2.49) 
2.5.1.3 Effects of Population on Housing Price, Housing Consumption, Urban Land 
Rent, and Structural Density 
These effects op
 
 erate through u, so 
0>∂
∂
∂
∂=
L
u
u
p
dL
dp  (2.50) 
 0>∂
∂
∂
∂=
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u
u
r
dL
dr  (2.51) 
 0<∂
∂
∂
∂=
L
u
u
q
dL
dq  (2.52) 
 0>∂
∂
∂
∂=
L
u
u
S
dL
dS  (2.53) 
 2.5.1.4 Effect of Population on the Tax-Share Variable 
 Totally differentiating (2.38) with respect to λ = L, ra, y, t, α we have 
 
2
2 2 2
0 0 0
(1 )
     (1 ) (1 )
x x x
L y xyL y L yL tx D
t D D ux Ddx t x Ddx t x dx
u
β θθ βθ βθ β αλ λ λ λ λ
αα αλ λ λ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂+ + + = −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎛ ⎞+ − − + − +⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠∫ ∫ ∫ λ∂
 (2.54) 
When λ = L, (2.54) becomes  
 
2 2
0
(1 ) (1 )
xx D utx D t x dx y
L u L
L yL
α αβ
θ
∂ ∂ ∂− + − −∂ >∂ ∂ ∂=∂ <
∫ βθ
 0 (2.55) 
 We showed earlier that the urban area boundary, housing price, urban land rent, 
and structural density were increasing functions of population, while utility and housing 
consumption were decreasing function of population. This means that an increase in 
population expands the urban area spatially and leads to a lower urban utility. Population 
increase also results in a higher housing price, higher land rent, and taller buildings eve-
rywhere within the urban area. As a result, urban residents consume less housing service.  
However, the effect of population on the tax-share variable is ambiguous. 
 The logic behind these results is that an increase in population creates an excess 
demand for housing, which causes housing price to rise throughout the urban area, induc-
ing urban residents to consume less housing. This expands the urban area because urban-
area residents can now outbid farmers for agricultural land at the old urban area bound-
ary. 
 On the supply side of the market, rising housing price causes housing producers to 
bid up urban land for housing production. Higher urban land rent in turn forces housing 
producers to build taller buildings. When buildings are taller and housing consumption is 
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 lower, population density increases everywhere. The increase in urban land rent every-
where also means that at the old urban-area boundary, urban land rent exceeds agricul-
tural land rent, the urban area’s boundary therefore expands until urban land equals agri-
cultural land rent again. Spatial expansion of the urban area and increase in urban popula-
tion density both contribute to the elimination of excess housing demand, bringing the 
urban area to a new equilibrium with a larger urban area, higher population density, 
higher housing price, higher land rent, taller buildings, lower housing consumption, and 
lower utility level. The effect of an increase in population on the tax-share variable is 
ambiguous because when population increases, more revenue is collected, but more miles 
are driven because of the urban-area’s spatial expansion.  
2.5.2 Effects of Changes in Agricultural Land Rent 
2.5.2.1 Effect of Agricultural Rent on Utility 
 When λ = ra  (2.44) becomes  
   
0
0 0
0  
x
a
x x
a
rx dx
ru
r rr dx dx
u u
∂− ∂∂ = =∂ ∂∂
∂ ∂
∫
∫ ∫
x <  (2.56) 
since because r is not a function of r/ 0ar r∂ ∂ = a. 
2.5.2.2 Effect of Agricultural Rent on Urban Area Boundary 
 When λ = ra, (2.48) becomes 
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a
∂
∂
∂
∂
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∂ 1  (2.57) 
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From (2.34), we know that 
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Integrating by parts, where /u r= ∂ ∂  and dv = dx, then 
 
x x x
0 0 0
0
1
x
r r r r r rdx x x x dx x x dx
u u u x u u x u
hx dx
x qV
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− = − − = −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞∂= ⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠
∫ ∫ ∫
∫
 
Upon differentiating the integrand, we have 
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VxVx
D
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h
x ⎟⎟⎠
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⎛
∂
∂+∂
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To determine the sign of this expression requires determining the sign of its partial de-
rivative, since > 0 and D > 0   1V
 02 <∂
∂−∂
∂′
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∂
q
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qhq
x
Sh
x
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 since > 0,  h′ 0<∂
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since 
x
V
∂
∂ 1 > 0 for x a normal good (see Wheaton (1974) p. 227).
Therefore, we have 
  
ar
x
∂
∂ < 0 (2.58) 
2.5.2.3 Effects of Agricultural Rent on Housing Price, Housing Consumption, Urban 
Land Rent, and Structural Density 
 0>∂
∂
∂
∂=
aa r
u
u
p
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dp  (2.59) 
 0<∂
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u
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dq  (2.60) 
 
aa r
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∂= > 0 (2.61) 
 0>∂
∂
∂
∂=
aa r
u
u
S
dr
dS  (2.62) 
(Note we use total derivatives here since the corresponding partial derivatives are all 
zero.) 
2.5.2.4 Effect of Agricultural Rent on the Tax-Share Variable 
When λ = ra, (2.54) becomes 
 2 2
0
1 (1 ) (1 )
x
a a
x Dtx D t x dx
r yL r u r
β α αθ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂= − + −⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎜∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠∫ a
u∂ ⎟⎟∂  (2.63) 
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 Upon totally differentiating (2.37) with respect to ra, we have 
 
0
0
x
a a
x D uxD x dx
r u r
∂ ∂ ∂+ =∂ ∂ ∂∫ , or 
0
x
a
a
D ux dx
u rx
r xD
∂ ∂
∂ ∂∂ = −∂
∫
 (2.64) 
Substituting (2.64) into (2.63), we have 
 2
0
1 (1 ) ( ) 0
x
a a
D ut x xx dx
r yL u r
β αθ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞∂ ∂= − −⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎜∂ ∂⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠∫
∂ <⎟⎟∂  (2.65) 
 An increase in agricultural rent reduces the urban area spatially and lowers urban- 
area residents’ utility. It also increases housing price, urban land rent, and structural den-
sity everywhere. As a consequence, urban population density increases, but housing con-
sumption and the tax-share variable decrease.  
 The logic behind these results is similar to that of an increase in population. When 
agricultural rent increases, urban land rent at the old urban boundary is lower than agri-
cultural land rent, which reduces the urban area spatially. This change, however, creates 
excess demand for housing because the unchanged population must fit within the new 
urban boundary. Excess demand for housing increases housing price and decreases hous-
ing consumption everywhere within the urban area. Both rising housing price and rising 
agricultural rent push urban land rent up; as a consequence, housing producers build 
higher buildings. Since the urban area shrinks spatially and population density increases 
everywhere, people drive fewer miles from home to work, which lowers the proportion of 
local tax revenues used for the transportation subsidy. 
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 2.5.3 Effects of Change in Income  
2.5.3.1 Effect of Income on Utility 
 When λ = y, (2.44) becomes 
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2.5.3.2 Effect of Income on Urban Area Boundary 
 When λ = y, (2.48) becomes 
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Recall that V1 is the first partial derivative of the utility function with respect to the com-
posite good, so 
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1
1
11and  00
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 ,VV, tV
x
V
,  V <>>−=∂
∂> α . Given these results, 
we derive 
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2.5.3.3 Effects of Income on Housing Price, Housing Consumption, Urban Land 
Rent, and Structural Density  
 The effect of an increase in income on housing price is complicated because in-
come not only directly affects housing price, but also indirectly affects it through the util-
ity level. Therefore, the relationship between income and housing price can be written as  
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 At a given distance, , let housing price be , where 0 <  < xˆ pˆ pˆ p , i.e., p evalu-
ated at 0< <xˆ x . From (2.30), (2.34), and (2.67), we have 
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Substituting these into (2.71), we obtain 
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 At the urban area boundary ( xx = ), 
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at the urban area boundary. At the CBD (x = 0), 0 Hence  .01ˆ
1 0
11
<>−
dy
dp
VV
 at the CBD, 
where the subscript means evaluation at x = 0. Thus, the housing price function pivots 
counterclockwise. Because of the dependence of urban land rent and structural density on 
housing price, these functions pivot counterclockwise. The effect of income on housing 
consumption is more complicated, however. Breuckner (1987, p. 835) shows that q falls 
with y for , but is ambiguous for   pp ˆ< pp ˆ>
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 2.5.3.4 Effect of Income on the Tax-Share Variable 
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Following Brueckner (1987), let 
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p
u
D < 0 since Γ > 0, 
u
p
∂
∂ < 0, and Λ< 0   (2.76) 
Therefore, we have 
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 The effects of an increase in income on endogenous variables are a little compli-
cated. As we see from the above results, an increase in income will expand the city spa-
tially and increase urban residents’ utility level. It will also increase housing service con-
sumption and population density when p falls, but the effects on q and D are ambiguous 
when p rises. Income’s effect on housing price, urban land rent, and structural density is 
to pivot these functions counterclockwise. Its effect on the proportion of local tax reve-
nues used for the transportation subsidy is ambiguous.  
 Thus, according to our model, as income increases, people want to consume more 
housing. Since housing is cheaper farther out, the demand for housing farther from the 
CBD rises, causing price to rise there and to fall closer to the CBD. Because urban land 
rent and structural density are directly related to housing price, an increase in income will 
have the same effects on urban land rent and structural density as on housing price. When 
housing price falls close to the CBD, housing consumption per household increases there. 
In the area close to the urban boundary, the effect of an increase in income on housing 
consumption is ambiguous. The possible explanation is that rising housing price, urban 
land rent and structural density there, by themselves, reduce housing consumption. This, 
however, may be offset by rising utility because of increase in income. The effect of in-
come on the tax-share variable is ambiguous because, on the one hand, an increase in in-
come raises the tax base, while, on the other hand, as people move farther away from the 
CBD, they drive more miles and require more subsidy. 
2.5.4 Effects of Change in Commuting Cost  
2.5.4.1 Effect of Commuting Cost on Utility  
 When λ=t, (2.44) becomes  
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x
x
L r dxu t
rt dx
u
α
δ
∂−∂ ∂= ∂∂
∂
∫
∫
 (2.78) 
Because 0<−=∂
∂
q
hx
t
r α  and 
u
r
∂
∂ < 0 
 
t
u
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2.5.4.2 Effect of Commuting Cost on Urban Area Boundary 
 From (2.48), substituting t for λ, we have  
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t
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Totally differentiating (2.37) respect to t and substituting 
t
u
∂
∂ into it, we have  
 
0
0
xx D D uxD x dx
t t u t
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎛ ⎞+ +⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠∫ =  (since 0=∂∂=∂∂ ttL δ ) (2.80) 
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After rearranging terms, we have 
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Since 0<∂
∂
u
r , 0<∂
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u
D , and 0<∂
∂
x
r , then, from (2.81) we know that  
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 Furthermore, since .for    and   then ,0
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2.5.4.3 Effects of Commuting Cost on Housing Price, Housing Consumption, Urban 
Land Rent, and Structural Density 
 Recall 
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 At a given location, housing price is affected by commuting cost both directly and 
indirectly through the utility function. Consequently, 
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Substitute the following into the parenthetical expression in the right-hand side of (2.84) 
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2.5.4.4 Effect of Commuting Cost on the Tax-Share Variable 
 When λ = t, (2.54) becomes 
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 From the above results, we conclude that an increase in commuting cost reduces 
urban residents’ utility and shrinks the urban area spatially. The effects of an increase in 
commuting cost on housing price, urban population, land rent, and structural density vary 
with location, raising these variables near the CBD and lowering them farther out. The 
effect of commuting cost on housing consumption and population density are more com-
plicated. An increase in commuting cost lowers housing consumption and raises popula-
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 tion density near the CBD, but its effect is ambiguous farther out. Finally, the effect of 
commuting cost on the tax-share variable is ambiguous.  
 Our explanation for the results is that as transport cost per round-trip mile in-
creases, people seek locations closer to the CBD to minimize transport costs. This 
movement reduces the spatial area of the city and lower residents’ utility. Also, as people 
move closer to the CBD, they drive up land rent and housing price there while driving 
those variables down farther out. This, in turn, causes households to consume less hous-
ing in taller buildings near the CBD and raises the population density there, while lower-
ing structural density farther out. The effects on housing consumption and population 
density farther from the CBD are, however, ambiguous. This is so because the low hous-
ing price and land rent farther out, by themselves, would tend to raise housing consump-
tion and lower population density. But the lower utility may offset these results. The ef-
fect of commuting cost on the tax-share variable is ambiguous because, on the one hand, 
an increase in commuting cost per round-trip mile induces more transportation subsidy, 
while, on the other hand, the urban area shrinks spatially and people drive fewer miles, 
which reduces the transportation subsidy.  
2.5.5 Effects of Change in Private Cost Share  
2.5.5.1 Effect of Private Cost Share on Utility  
 Recall that  
 0<−=∂
∂
q
txhr
α  and 1 0
r h
u qV
∂ = − <∂  
Then, for λ = α, (2.44) becomes 
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2.5.5.2 Effect of Private Cost Share on Urban Area Boundary 
 Equation (2.47), with λ =α , becomes 
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 2.5.5.3 Effects of Private Cost Share on Housing Price, Housing Consumption, Ur-
ban Land Rent, and Structural Density  
 Given the fact that α affects housing price both directly and indirectly through the 
utility function, we have 
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Then substituting from (2.32), (2.34), and (2.90), we get 
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 At the CBD where x = 0, (2.95) is positive, which means that 00 >αd
dp
. At the urban area 
boundary, where =xˆ x , (2.95) is of ambiguous sign. Nevertheless, it can be shown that 
αd
pd < 0 and that the price function pivots clockwise about some 0 < x  < ˆ x . First, recall 
that the boundary value of p is invariant to exogenous variables other than ra and i. Thus, 
p is invariant to α. But, since α∂
∂x < 0, then α∂
∂p < 0. Also, since p decreases monotonically 
with x, the p function must pivot clockwise about some . Thus, xˆ
 
ˆ0         0
ˆ0         
ˆ0        
x x
dp x x
d
x x x
α
> ≤⎧⎪= =⎨⎪< <⎩
<
≤
 (2.96) 
 From (2.16) and (2.17), we know that S and r functions exhibit the same behavior 
as the p function, then 
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  As we have seen in other contexts, the effect on q is more complicated. Since q 
falls when p rises but is ambiguous when p falls, then 
 
ˆ0         0
ˆ0        
x x
dq
d x x xα
< ≤⎧⎪⎨> ≤ ≤⎪⎩<
<
 (2.99) 
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 2.5.5.4 Effect of Private Cost Share on the Tax-Share Variable 
 When λ = α, (2.54) becomes 
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yL u
β α αα θ α α α
∂ ⎡ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎛= − − + − +⎜⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∫ ∫
⎤⎞⎟∂  (2.100) 
Totally differentiating (2.37) with respect to α and solving for α∂
∂x , we have  
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Substituting the above equation into (2.100), getting 
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1 (1 ) ( )
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x xd Dt x Ddx t x x x dx
d yL u
β αα θ α α
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D u < 0 (2.101) 
 From the above results, we see that an increase in α reduces the urban area spa-
tially, lowers utility, and lowers the tax-share variable. An increase in α increases hous-
ing price, urban land rent, and structural density in the areas close to CBD while lowering 
these variables in areas close to the urban-area boundary. Finally, an increase in α lowers 
housing consumption near the CBD but may raise, lower, or leave housing consumption 
unchanged near the urban-area boundary.  
 Our explanation for these results is that as households’ unsubsidized transport 
cost increases, people seek locations nearer the CBD. This movement reduces the urban 
area spatially and lowers residents’ utility level. As people move closer to the CBD, they 
drive up land rents and housing prices there while driving down those variables father 
from the CBD. This, in turn, causes households to consume less housing in taller build-
ings near the CBD, while lowering structural density farther out. The effects on housing 
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 consumption and population density farther from the CBD area are, however, ambiguous. 
This is so because the lower housing price and land rent farther out, by themselves, 
would tend to raise housing consumption and lower population density. But the lower 
utility level may offset these results. Finally, because the private share of commuting cost 
increases, the tax-share variable is reduced.  
 Table 2.1 summarizes the comparative static analysis of the single-mode urban 
spatial model. We find that an increase in population and income results in urban expan-
sion, while an increase in agricultural land and commuting cost shrinks the urban area 
spatially.  Since our goal is to explain how transport subsidies affect urban sprawl, we 
emphasize /x α∂ ∂ . We find that in a single-mode model, when subsidies increase, the 
urban area expands spatially. This is so because an increase in transport subsidies raises 
people’s income net of transport cost, which results in a higher demand for housing in 
suburban areas because of lower housing price there. Consequently, housing price, urban 
land rent, and structural density in the suburbs increase, which leads to spatial expansion 
of the urban area. This finding suggests that subsidized transport is a contributor to urban 
sprawl in a single-mode model. 
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  Table 2.1 
 Comparative Static Results of Single-Mode Model 
Endogenous Variable Exogenous 
Variable U x  S r p q β  
L - + + + + - ? 
x x′< - - + + + - ? 
t 
x x′> - - - - - ? ? 
x x′< + + - - - + ? 
y 
x x′> + + + + + ? ? 
ra - - + + + - - 
x NC NC - - - + NC 
x x′< + + - - - + + 
1-α  
x x′> + + + + + ? + 
 
    57
  
 
  CHAPTER 3 TWO-MODE URBAN SPATIAL MODEL 
 We now relax the assumption that only one transport mode prevails within a city. 
We begin with some new definitions and assumptions, proceed to a detailed discussion of 
the behavioral equations of the model, and then provide a comparative static analysis. 
3.1 Modal Choice and Preliminary Results Used for Comparative Static Analysis 
 All definitions and assumptions from the single-mode model remain unchanged 
except the following: Two different transport modes, 1 and 2, are available in the urban 
area and cost of commuting by each mode incurred by a resident at location x is repre-
sented as follows: 
 58
2  1,     )( =+= ixtfxM iiii α   (3.1) 
where f represents fixed cost, which includes all travel cost independent of distance trav-
eled, and xt iiα represents private variable cost, which include all costs that vary with 
distance traveled. We assume that variable cost is proportional to distance. As in Ch. 2, 
the α’s represent the proportion of total variable cost directly paid by travelers. We also 
assume that f 1 < f 2 while α1t1 > α2t2.  As in Ch. 2, (1 – αi) represents the governmental 
subsidy per round-trip mile. 
 These assumptions imply that Mode 2 has a higher fixed cost but a lower variable 
cost per round-trip mile because it runs faster, more conveniently, more efficiently or re-
ceives a larger governmental subsidy. It is necessary to assume that Mode 1’s fixed cost 
is less than Mode 2’s but that its variable cost per mile is greater so that one mode will 
not dominate the other for all trips. In our model, a resident chooses between two modes. 
 He will be indifferent between the two modes if he lives at  
where
xˆ
)/()(ˆ 221112 ttffx αα −−= , will choose Mode 1 if he lives between CBD and  and 
will choose Mode 2 if he lives between xˆ  and the urban area boundary. Therefore we 
refer to Mode 1 as the central city mode and Mode 2 as the suburban mode
xˆ
 
. 
 Based on the new assumptions, the single-mode urban spatial model is modified 
as follows. Each individual chooses the amount of a composite good, c, and the amount 
of residential housing, q, so as to maximize utility 
 u = u(c, q) 
subject to a budget constraint 
  xMypqcy )(+++= θ , where  { }1 2( ) min ( ) ( )M x M x ,M= x
]
 
Substituting c from the budget constraint into the utility function, the requirement that the 
maximized utility equals u can be written as 
 [(1 ) ( ),Max V u
q
y pq M x qθ =− − −  (3.2) 
 Since (3.2) represents the maximized utility, two conditions must hold. First, 
since consumers choose q optimally conditional on p, the first-order condition must hold, 
that is 
 p
qMpqyV
qMpqyV
i
i =−−−
−−−
],)1[(
],)1[(
1
2
θ
θ   (3.3) 
Also, the resulting consumption bundle must generate the spatial equilibrium utility, u, so 
that 
  ],)1[( uqMpgyV i =−−−θ  
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  Given the assumption of mode choice, the exogenous variables are x, y, ti, αi, θ, i, 
G and fi (i = 1, 2). We suppress the variables i and G because they play no important role 
in our analysis. In presenting the results for p, q, S and r, we suppress notation identifying 
the mode, except for ti and αi, because these results hold for either mode. Later, it will 
become necessary to distinguish these variables by mode.  
 Using the same method as in Ch. 2, we get 
 0        0i i
u
tp q q
x q x p x
α ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂= − < = >⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
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∂  (3.4) 
 1 0         0
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 Except for the addition of fixed cost, nothing is changed in the housing production 
sector of the model, so, from Ch. 2, we have     
 ϕϕ ∂
∂
′′
′−=∂
∂ p
hp
hS   (3.11) 
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  ϕϕ ∂
∂=∂
∂ phr   (3.12) 
where , , , , ,i i ix y t f uϕ α= . 
 Under our assumption, Mode 1 is used from the CBD to , and Mode 2 is used 
from  to 
xˆ
xˆ x . Hence, the boundary condition is more complicated than that of the single-
mode model, namely, 
 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2ˆ ˆ( , , , , , , ) ( , , , , , , )r x y t u f r x y t u fα θ α= θ  (3.13) 
 2 2 2( , , , , , , ) ar x y t u f rα θ =   (3.14) 
The population and balanced budget condition must also reflect mode choice. The popu-
lation condition becomes 
 
ˆ
1 1, 1, 1 2 2 2, 2ˆ0
( , , , , ) ( , , , , )
x x
x
xD x y t f i dx xD x y t f i dx Lδ α θ δ α θ+ =∫ ∫  (3.15) 
where Di represent population density. The balanced budget condition becomes
 
ˆ 2
1 1 1 2 2 2ˆ0
(1 ) (1 )
x x
x
yL G t x D dx t x D dxβθ α α+ = − + −∫ ∫ 2  (3.16) 
3.2 Comparative Static Analysis  
 The goal of the analysis is to deduce the impact of changes in L, ra, y, ti, αi, and fi 
on the spatial size of the urban area, x , housing price, pi, land rent, ri, housing consump-
tion, qi, structural density, Si, utility level, u, and the tax-share variable, β. Given that the 
purpose of this thesis is to study the relationship between urban sprawl and transportation 
subsidies, we ignore the effects of the exogenous variables G, and i. 
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  Recall 
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hD α
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−==  (note we often use hi as shorthand for h(Si)) 
Substitute this into (3.15) to get 
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Integrating by parts, where u = x and dv =
ˆ
1 2
ˆ0
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x x
x
r rx dx x dx
x x
∂ ∂
∂ ∂∫ ∫ , we get 
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Because , we have )ˆ()ˆ( 21 xrxr =
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Totally differentiating (3.20) with respect to 1 2 1 2 1 2, , , , , , , ,aL r y t t f fλ α α= , we have 
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  2 2 2ˆ
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3.2.1 Effects of Change in Population  
3.2.1.1 Effect of Population on Utility  
 If L=λ , (3.21) becomes 
 ˆ1 1 1 2 2 1 1
0
1 1 2 2 1 1
ˆ( ) 1ˆ
xr x t t r r ux dx
L t t t L u L
α α
α α α
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t L u L
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α δ
∂ ∂ ∂⎛ ⎞+ +⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠∫ =  (3.22) 
Since are not functions of L, (3.22) becomes )( and ),ˆ(),( 211 xrxrxr
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Then, since u is not a function of x, we have  
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1 1 2 2
1
1 1x x
x
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L r rdx dx
t u t u
δ α α
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Because 0)(
11
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∂
Vq
Sh
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r  and 0
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12
22 <−∂
∂
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Sh
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 0<∂
∂
L
u   (3.24) 
3.2.1.2 Effect of Population on Urban Area Boundary  
 Totally differentiating (3.14) with respect to λ = L, ra , t1, t2, α1, α2, f1, and f2
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Since 02 <∂
∂
x
r
, then we have 
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∂
∂ = 2Sign ar r u r
L u L L
∂ 2∂ ∂ ∂⎛− − −⎜ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
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ra , this becomes 
 Sign
L
x
∂
∂ = Sign ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+∂
∂
∂
∂
L
r
L
u
u
r 22   (3.28) 
From (3.24), we know 0<∂
∂
L
u , and 2 0arr
L L
∂∂ = =∂ ∂ because is not a function of L except 
through u. Also
2r
02 <∂
∂
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r
 from (3.10) and (3.12), so 
Sign ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
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∂
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∂
L
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u
r2  > 0, which means  
 
L
x
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∂ > 0  (3.29) 
3.2.1.3 Effects of Population on Housing Price, Housing Consumption, Structural 
Density and Urban Land Rent  
 0>∂
∂
∂
∂=
L
u
u
p
dL
dp ii , i =1,2 (from (3.10) and (3.24)) (3.30) 
 0<∂
∂
∂
∂=
L
u
u
q
dL
dq ii , i =1,2  (from (3.10) and (3.24)) (3.31) 
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  0
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i
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3.2.1.4 Effect of Population on the Tax-Share Variable  
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  Since we do not know the sign of the second and third terms of (3.34), 0<
>
dL
dβ . 
 We have shown that, in a two-mode urban spatial structure model, the results are 
the same as in the single-mode urban spatial model. When population increases, the ur-
ban area boundary, housing price, urban land rent, and structural density also increase, 
while the utility level and housing consumption fall. The effect of population on the tax-
share variable is ambiguous. 
3.2.2 Effects of Change in Agricultural Land Rent 
3.2.2.1 Effect of on Agricultural Land Rent on Utility  
 When ar=λ , (3.21) becomes 
 
ˆ
1 1
0
2 2 1 1
1 1 x
a a
r r ux dx
t t r u rα α
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂− + +⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠∫ 2 2ˆ2 2
1 0
x
x
a a
r r u dx
t r u rα
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂+ +⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠∫ =  (3.35) 
Since are not functions of  except through u, then2 1  and rr ar 021 =∂
∂=∂
∂
aa r
r
r
r , and since u is 
not a function of x, (3.34) becomes 
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After rearranging terms, we have 
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3.2.2.2 Effect of Agricultural Land Rent on Urban Area Boundary   
 Differentiate (3.15) with respect to , getting ar
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The first and last term on the left side of (3.37) cancel because . Solving 
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. Thus, we know that (3.38) is negative; that is  
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3.2.2.3 Effects of Agricultural Land Rent on Housing Price, Housing Consumption, 
Structural Density, and Urban Land Rent 
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3.2.2.4 Effect of Agricultural Land Rent on the Tax-Share Variable 
 
ˆ 2 21 2
1 1 2 2ˆ0
2
2 2
(1 ) (1 )
1 0
(1 ) ( )
x x
x
a
a
a
D u D ut x dx t x dx
u r u r
xr yL t x D x
r
α αβ
θ α
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤− + −⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ >⎢ ⎥= ∂∂ <⎢ ⎥+ −⎢ ⎥∂⎣ ⎦
∫ ∫
a  (3.44) 
because 0>∂
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∂
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D
 while 
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x
∂
∂ < 0. 
 The results of an increase in rural land rent are the same as in the one-mode urban 
spatial model. When agricultural land rent increases, the utility level attained by urban 
area residents falls and the urban area shrinks spatially. An increase in agricultural rent 
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also raises housing price, urban land rent, and structural density everywhere but reduces 
urban residents’ housing consumption. Its effect on the tax-share variable is ambiguous. 
 3.2.3 Effects of Change in Income  
3.2.3.1 Effect of Income on Utility 
 When y=λ , (3.21) becomes 
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since xMMrrrr a ˆat   and,,ˆˆ 21221 === . Then, since u is not a function of x, we have 
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Since f2  > f1, 0
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3.2.3.2 Effect of Income on Urban Area Boundary  
 From (3.26), and the fact that 02 <∂
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x
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The sign of 
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∂ is the opposite of the sign of the numerator of (3.48), the numerator of 
(3.48) is  
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Substitute the following equations into (3.49) 
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 3.2.3.3 Effects of Income on Housing Price, Housing Consumption, Structural Den-
sity, and Urban Land Rent 
 The effect of income on price includes direct and indirect effects 
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3.2.3.4 Effect of Income on the Tax-Share Variable 
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  In the two-mode urban spatial model, an increase in income increases urban resi-
dents’ utility. Its effects on the urban area boundary, housing price, urban land rent, struc-
tural density, and the tax-share variable are ambiguous. 
3.2.4 Effects of Change in Mode 1’s Variable Commuting Cost 
3.2.4.1 Effect of Mode 1’s Variable Commuting Cost on Utility  
Since  is not a function of  and 2r 1t arr =2 , then when λ = t1, (3.21) becomes 
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Upon integrating by parts where 
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Substitute this into (3.57) and rearrange terms, noting that 21 ˆˆ rr = , then 
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3.2.4.2 Effects of Mode 1’s Variable Commuting Cost on Urban Area Boundary 
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  Recall (3.15), 
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LxD x dx xD x dx δ+ =∫ ∫ .  Totally differentiating (3.15) with 
respect to t1 yields 
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Because = , and after rearranging terms, (3.61) becomes )ˆ(1 xD )ˆ(2 xD
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Recall from (3.25), since  is not a function of  and 2r 1t arr =2 ,  1/ar t 0∂ ∂ = , we have 
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Substituting (3.63) into (3.62), we have 
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 After rearranging terms of (3.64), we have 
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We also need to obtain the sign of 
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, given (3.66) and (3.67), the de-
nominator and numerator in (3.65) are both positive, so we have 
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3.2.4.3 Effects of Mode 1’s Variable Commuting Cost on Housing Price, Housing 
Consumption, Structural Density, and Urban Land Rent  
 The total effect of Mode 1’s transport cost on housing price in the area of Mode 1 
is 
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3.2.4.4 Effect of Mode 1’s Variable Commuting Cost on the Tax-Share Variable 
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 In a two-mode urban spatial model, an increase in Mode 1’s variable commuting 
cost results in a lower utility level, which is the same as in the a single-mode model. The 
above results show that an increase in Mode 1’s commuting cost expands the urban area 
spatially, however, while in a single-mode model, an increase in commuting cost shrinks 
the urban area spatially. The effects of this variable on housing price, housing consump-
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 tion, urban land rent, and structural density in the area between the CBD and  are am-
biguous, while it increases housing price, land rent, and structural density while decreas-
ing housing consumption in the area between  and x. The effect of an increase in Mode 
1’s variable commuting cost on the tax-share variable is ambiguous. 
xˆ
xˆ
 An intuitive explanation is that when Mode 1’s commuting cost increases, all 
other things equal, the area using Mode 1 shrinks. (Recall that 
221
12ˆ
tt
ffx αα −
−= , so 
0
ˆ
1
<∂
∂
t
x ) For those residents located in the area between the new  and the original , 
Mode 1’s commuting cost exceeds that of Mode 2. Those residents switch from Mode 1 
to Mode 2. Mode 1’s higher t induces households between the old and the new  to 
move farther from the CBD because their income net of transportation cost increases. 
Their move farther from CBD bids up housing price in the areas between  and the ur-
ban area boundary, which in turn raises urban land rent and structural density but lowers 
per-household housing consumption. Because of the increase in t
xˆ xˆ
xˆ
xˆ
1, people originally lo-
cated in the area between the CBD and new  have lower income net of transportation 
costs, which lowers the demand for housing. At the same time, however, an increase in 
Mode 1’s commuting cost makes living closer to the CBD more desirable, which bids up 
housing price close to the CBD. This in turn raises urban land rent and structural density 
in the area close to the CBD. As a result, when there is an increase in Mode 1’s commut-
ing cost, its effects on housing price, urban land rent, and structural density in the area 
between the CBD and  are ambiguous. An increase in Mode 1’s commuting cost re-
duces population density in the area between the CBD and the new , but its effect on 
xˆ
xˆ
xˆ
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 population density in the area between  and the urban area boundary is ambiguous. 
Thus, its effect on total transportation subsidies is ambiguous. As a result, the effect of an 
increase in Mode 1’s variable cost on the tax-share variable is ambiguous. 
xˆ
3.2.5 Effects of Change in Mode 1’s Private Cost Share 
3.2.5.1 Effect of Mode 1’s Private Cost Share on Utility  
 When λ = α1, (3.21) becomes 
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3.2.5.2 Effect of Mode 1’s Private Cost Share on Urban Area Boundary 
 Recall (3.15) 
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Totally differentiating (3.15) with respect to 1α  yields 
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Substitute (3.81) into (3.80) and rearrange terms, getting 
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, the denominator of (3.82) is positive, so the sign of (3.82) 
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1α∂
∂x > 0 
3.2.5.3 Effects of Mode 1’s Private Cost Share on Housing Price, Housing Service 
Consumption, Urban Land Rent, and Structural Density 
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 3.2.5.4 Effects of Mode 1’s Private Cost Share on the Tax-Share Variable 
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 These results show that when the private share of Mode 1’s variable commuting 
cost increases, urban residents’ utility falls and the urban area expands spatially. Its ef-
fects on housing price, housing consumption, urban land rent, and structural density in 
the area of Mode 1’s use are ambiguous. An increase in the private share of Mode 1’s 
variable costs raises housing price, urban land rent, and structural density while lowering 
housing consumption in the area of Mode 2’s use. The effect on the tax-share revenue is 
ambiguous. 
 The intuitive explanation is similar to that of an increase in Mode 1’s variable 
commuting cost. When the private share of Mode 1’s variable commuting cost increases, 
the area for which Mode 1 is cheaper shrinks (recall that 
221
12ˆ
tt
ffx αα −
−= , so 0ˆ
1
<∂
∂
t
x ). The 
people who originally located between the new smaller  and old  now use Mode 2. 
Since they now use Mode 2, which has a lower variable cost than Mode 1, they are moti-
vated to relocate farther from the CBD because their income net of transport cost in-
xˆ xˆ
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 creases. Their move farther from the CBD bids up housing price in the area between  
and 
xˆ
x , which in turn increases urban land rent and structural density while reducing 
housing consumption. 
 For the people originally located in the area between the CBD and the new , an 
increase in 
xˆ
1α  reduces their income net of travel cost. As a result, demand for housing 
falls, which results in a lower housing price, urban land rent, and structural density. An 
increase in 1α  also makes living close to the CBD more desirable, which bids up housing 
price close to the CBD, and increases urban land rent and structural density there. Over-
all, an increase in 1α  has ambiguous effects on housing price, urban land rent, and struc-
tural density in the area between the CBD and . Its effect on the tax-share variable is 
ambiguous because, on the one hand, an increase in 
xˆ
1α  decreases the subsidies needed 
for Mode 1, while, on the other hand, it expands the urban area boundary, which in-
creases the total miles driven by the residents, thus increasing the subsidies needed for 
Mode 2.  
3.2.6 Effects of Change in Mode 2’s Variable Commuting Cost 
3.2.6.1 Effect of Mode 2’s Variable Commuting Cost on Utility 
 When 2t=λ , (3.21) becomes  
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ˆ
1
1 22 ˆ0
1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2
ˆ1 1 1ˆ( )
x x
x
r u xdx r x r dx
t u t t t tα α α
∂ ∂ ∂+ + −∂ ∂ ∂∫ ∫  
 2 2 2 1ˆ
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
ˆ1 1 1 ˆ( ) ( ) 0
x
x
r r u x xdx r x r x
t t u t t t t tα α α
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂+ + + −⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠∫ =  (3.92) 
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 Upon substituting 22 12 2 2 2ˆ ˆ
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1ˆ ˆ
x x
ax x
rr dx xr xr x dx
t t t tα α α α x
∂= − − ∂∫ ∫  into (3.92) and rear-
ranging terms, we have 
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2
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∂
t
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t
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3.2.6.2 Effect of Mode 2’s Variable Commuting Cost on Urban Area Boundary 
 Totally differentiating (3.15) with respect to t2 yields 
 
ˆ
1 2
1 2 ˆ0
2 2 2 2
2
2
ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( )
ˆˆ ˆ( ) 0
x x
x
x D u x D u D2
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Then 
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xxDx ∂
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Totally differentiating boundary condition (3.14) with respect to , we have 2t
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∂
2
2
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Substitute this into (3.96) and rearrange terms; then we have  
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1 2 2 2 2 2
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∫ ∫ ∫
∫ ∫
 (3.97) 
 The sign of (3.97) is determined by the numerator because the denominator is 
positive. 
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This seems to imply that the numerator of (3.97) is ambiguous, but this is not so. Recall that 
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t q
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u u
∂ ∂= Γ + Λ Γ > Λ <∂ ∂  
 01 >∂
∂
x
V
 
 011
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  Upon substituting the above along with the previously derived expression for
2
2D∂  
t∂
into (3.97), we have 
 2 2 2 2
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2 2
x
x
D r D rx dx
t u u t
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂−⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠∫ = 2 2 2 2ˆ 2 2
x
x
p r p rx dx
t u u t
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 = 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
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2 2 1 2 1 2 2
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x
x h S h S h S x h S xx dx
q q V q V q q
α α⎡ ⎤Γ −Γ + Λ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫
α  
 = 2 2 2 2
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h S x h S xx dx x
q q V V q
α ⎛ ⎞Γ − + Λ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ ∫ dx
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Since 1 2
0
2
0
x D rx dx
u t
∂ ∂− ∂ ∂∫ < , then the numerator of (3.97) is negative, so 
 
2t
x
∂
∂ < 0 
3.2.6.3 Effects of Mode 2’s Variable Commuting Cost on Housing Price, Housing 
Service Consumption, Urban Land Rent, and Structural Density 
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1
t
u
u
p
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∂
∂
∂
∂=  > 0  (3.99) 
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2
1 h
dt
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2
1
t
p
∂
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2
1
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1 1 2
h p
p h t
′ ∂− ′′ ∂
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 <∂
∂
∂
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2
1
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u
u
q
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dq
 0  (3.102) 
 
2
2
2
2
2
2
t
p
t
u
u
p
dt
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∂
∂+∂
∂
∂
∂=               (3.103) 
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 Because 
u
p
∂
∂ 2 < 0, 
2t
u
∂
∂ < 0, and 
2
2
t
p
∂
∂ < 0, the sign of (3.103) is ambiguous. Therefore, we 
have  
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2 h
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∂
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dq 0  (3.106) 
3.2.6.4 Effect of Mode 2’s Variable Commuting Cost on the Tax-Share Variable 
 
ˆ2 2 1
1 1 1 1 10
2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2ˆ
2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2 2ˆ
2
ˆˆ ˆ(1 ) ( ) (1 )
1  (1 ) ( ) (1 )  0
ˆˆ ˆ(1 ) ( ) (1 )
x
x
x
x
x
x D ux t D x t x dx
t u t
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α α
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<∂
∂
t
x , but 0
2
2
2
2
<
>
∂
∂
∂
∂+∂
∂
t
u
u
D
t
D
. 
 From the above results, we conclude that an increase in Mode 2’s variable com-
muting cost reduces utility and shrinks the urban area spatially. Its effects on housing 
price, housing consumption, urban land rent, and structural density are ambiguous in the 
urban area between xˆ  and x . For the area between the CBD and xˆ , however, an in-
crease in Mode 2’s variable cost increases housing price, urban land rent, and structural 
density while decreasing housing consumption. The effect of Mode 2’s variable cost on 
the tax-share variable is ambiguous. 
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  The intuitive explanation is that as Mode 2’s variable cost increases, the area that 
uses Mode 1 expands from the old  to new (recall that xˆ xˆ
221
12ˆ
tt
ffx αα −
−= , so 0ˆ
2
<∂
∂
t
x ). 
For the people originally located in the area between the old and new , Mode 1’s com-
muting cost is cheaper than that of Mode 2; therefore, they replace Mode 2 with Mode 1, 
which makes living closer to the CBD desirable. As a result, housing price rises in the 
area between the old and new , which in turn bids up urban land rent and structural 
density while causing per-household housing consumption to fall. 
xˆ
xˆ
 For those people living between the new  and xˆ x , their income net of transport 
cost is reduced. As a result, housing price falls, which in turn reduces urban land rent and 
structural density while increasing housing consumption. Because urban land rent falls, 
the urban area shrinks spatially. On the other hand, an increase in Mode 2’s variable cost 
makes living closer to the CBD desirable, which bids up housing price and land rent, in-
creasing structural density and reducing housing consumption. Therefore, the overall ef-
fects of an increase in Mode 2’s variable cost on housing price, housing consumption, 
and structural density in this area are ambiguous. Its effect on the tax-share variable is 
ambiguous because, on the one hand, an increase in Mode 2’s commuting cost results in 
higher subsidies, while, on the other hand, such an increase shrinks the urban area, which 
reduces transport subsidies within the urban area. 
3.2.7 Effects of Change in Mode 2’s Private Cost Share  
3.2.7.1 Effect of Mode 2’s Private Cost Share on Utility  
 Let λ = α2 in (3.21), getting 
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Since 02 <∂
∂
x
r
, 0
2
2 <∂
∂
α
r
, and 0<∂
∂
u
ri , we have 
 
2α∂
∂u < 0 
3.2.7.2 Effect of Mode 2’s Private Cost Share on Urban Area Boundary   
 Totally differentiating (3.15) with respect to 2α  and canceling terms involving 
, we have )ˆ(ˆ 1 xDx
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x D u xx dx xD x
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Let λ = α2 in (3.25) and solve for 
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∂u ; then we have 
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Upon substituting this into (3.108) and solving for 
2α∂
∂x , we get 
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u  (3.109) 
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  We know that the denominator of (3.109) is positive; therefore the sign of (3.109) 
is determined by the numerator. We need to know the following to determine the sign of 
(3.109) 
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Substitute the above into the second and third terms of the numerator of (3.109); then we 
have 
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u uα α
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   = 0)11(
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22 <Λ+−Γ ∫∫ xxxx dxq xthdxVVqq xthx   
Because the first term of the numerator of (3.109) is negative, we conclude that 
 0
2
<∂
∂
α
x  
3.2.7.3 Effects of Mode 2’s Private Cost Share on Housing Price, Housing Consump-
tion, Urban Land Rent, and Structural Density 
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Because 
u
p
∂
∂ 2 < 0, 
2α∂
∂u < 0, and 
2
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< 0, the sign of (3.114) is ambiguous. Therefore, 
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3.2.7.4 Effect of Mode 2’s Private Cost Share on the Tax-Share Variable 
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 The above results show that an increase in the private share of Mode 2’s variable 
cost reduces urban residents’ utility and shrinks the urban area spatially. For the area be-
tween the CBD and , housing price, urban land rent, and structural density increase 
while housing consumption per household decreases. For the area between and the ur-
ban area boundary, the effects of the private share of Mode 2’s variable cost are ambigu-
ous. 
xˆ
xˆ
 The intuitive explanation is that when the private share of Mode 2’s variable 
commuting cost increases, the area in which Mode 1’s transportation cost is lower than 
Mode 2’s expands (recall that 
221
12ˆ
tt
ffx αα −
−= , so 0ˆ
2
<∂
∂
α
x ). Those people located be-
tween the old  and new  use Mode 1 rather than Mode 2, which makes living closer to 
the CBD desirable. As a result, housing price, urban land rent, and structural density in 
xˆ xˆ
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 the area increase, while per-household housing consumption decreases. For the people 
located between the new  and urban area boundary, an increase in the private share of 
Mode 2’s variable cost reduces income net of transportation costs, which reduces housing 
price, urban land rent, and structural density in the area. Because of the decrease in urban 
land rent, the urban area shrinks spatially. On the other hand, because of the increase in 
transportation costs, people are motivated to move closer to , which bids up housing 
price there. Therefore, the overall effects on housing price, urban land rent, and structural 
density in the area beyond  are ambiguous. The effect of the private share of Mode 2’s 
variable cost on the tax-share variable is ambiguous because an increase in the private 
share of Mode 2’s variable cost reduces subsidies for Mode 2’s use while increasing 
population density in the area between the CBD and , which in turn raises subsidies for 
Mode 1’s use. 
xˆ
xˆ
xˆ
xˆ
3.2.8 Effects of Change in Mode 1’s Fixed Cost
3.2.8.1 Effect of Mode 1’s Fixed Cost on Utility 
 When 1f=λ , (3.21) becomes 
 ( ) ( ) ˆ1 2 1 1 11 0
1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1
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Rearranging (3.118), we have 
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 Recall that 
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Therefore, we have 
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3.2.8.2 Effect of Mode 1’s Fixed Cost on Urban Area Boundary  
 Totally differentiating (3.15) with respect to , we have 1f
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Substitute 1f=λ into (3.26) and solve for 
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Substitute this into (3.120) to obtain 
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Rearranging the terms of (3.121), we have    
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3.2.8.3 Effects of Mode 1’s Fixed Cost on Housing Price, Housing Consumption, Ur-
ban Land Rent, and Structural Density 
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< 0, the sign of (3.123) is ambiguous. Therefore, we 
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3.2.8.4 Effect of Mode 1’s Fixed Cost on the Tax-Share Variable 
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 The above results show that an increase in Mode 1’s fixed cost leads to lower util-
ity but expands the urban area spatially. For the area between the CBD and , the effects 
of Mode 1’s fixed cost on housing price, housing consumption, urban land rent, and 
structural density are ambiguous. For the area between  and 
xˆ
xˆ x , however, an increase in 
Mode 1’s fixed cost increases housing price, urban land rent, and structural density while 
reducing housing consumption. The effect of Mode 1’s fixed cost on the tax-share vari-
able is ambiguous. 
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  The intuitive explanation is that an increase in Mode 1’s fixed commuting cost 
shrinks the area where Mode 1 is cheaper than Mode 2.  Those people located between 
the new  and old  switch to Mode 2. The resulting increase in their income net of 
transport cost motivates them to move farther from the CBD to enjoy lower housing 
prices and larger dwelling sizes. As a result, housing price beyond the new  increases, 
which in turn increases urban land rent and structural density. Rising urban land rent ex-
pands the urban area spatially.  
xˆ xˆ
xˆ
 For the people located in the area between the CBD and the new , an increase in 
Mode 1’s fixed cost reduces their income net of transport cost. Their demand for housing 
falls, leading to a decrease in housing price, lower urban land rent, and lower structural 
density. On the other hand, an increase in Mode 1’s fixed cost makes living closer to the 
CBD more desirable, which counteracts the income effect. Therefore, the overall effects 
on housing price, urban land rent, housing consumption, and structural density are am-
biguous in the area between the CBD and the new . The effect of an increase in Mode 
1’s fixed cost on the tax-share variable is ambiguous. An increase in Mode 1’s fixed cost 
expands the urban area, which increases subsidies for Mode 2. The effect on the subsidies 
for Mode 1 is ambiguous because the effect of Mode 1’s fixed cost on population density 
between the CBD and the new  is ambiguous. 
xˆ
xˆ
xˆ
3.2.9 Effects of Change in Mode 2’s Fixed Cost 
3.2.9.1 Effect of Mode 2’s Fixed Cost on Utility  
 When 2f=λ , (3.21) becomes 
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After rearranging terms, we have 
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3.2.9.2 Effect of Mode 2’s Fixed Cost on Urban Area Boundary 
 Totally differentiating (3.15) with respect to , we have  2f
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Substituting 2f=λ  into (3.25) and solving for 
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Substitute this into (3.133) and rearrange terms; then, we have 
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Since we know the denominator of (3.134) is positive, the sign of (3.134) is determined 
by the numerator.  
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  Upon substituting the following into the second and third terms of the numerator 
of (3.134), 
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Given that the first term of the numerator is negative, we have 
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3.2.9.3 Effects of Mode 2’s Fixed Cost on Housing Price, Housing Consumption, Ur-
ban Land Rent, and Structural Density 
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3.2.9.4 Effect of Mode 2’s Fixed Cost on the Tax-Share Variable 
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  We have shown that an increase in Mode 2’s fixed cost reduces urban residents’ 
utility and shrinks the urban area spatially. It increases housing price, urban land rent, and 
structural density in the area between the CBD and , while decreasing per-household 
housing consumption. The effects on these variables in the area between  and urban 
area boundary are ambiguous. The effect of an increase in Mode 2’s fixed cost on the tax-
share variable is ambiguous.  
xˆ
xˆ
 The intuitive explanation is very similar to that of an increase in Mode 2’s vari-
able commuting cost. An increase in Mode 2’s fixed cost increases the area using Mode 
1. Those people who originally located in the area between the new  and old  switch 
to Mode 1. Given the resulting decline in their income net of transport cost, living close 
to the CBD becomes more desirable. The increased demand for housing bids up housing 
price there, which in turn increases urban land rent and structural density while decreas-
ing housing consumption.  Those people located beyond the new  find their income net 
of transport cost fall, which lowers the demand for housing. This reduces housing price, 
urban land rent, and structural density. The decrease in urban land rent shrinks the urban 
area spatially. It also makes living closer to  more desirable, which increases housing 
price closer to . Therefore, its overall effects on housing price, housing consumption, 
urban land rent, and structural density are ambiguous. An increase in Mode 2’s fixed cost 
shrinks the urban area spatially, which reduces the subsidies needed for Mode 2; how-
ever, it raises population density in the area between the CBD and the new , thus in-
creasing the subsidies needed for Mode 1. Therefore, its overall effect on the tax-share 
variable is ambiguous. 
xˆ xˆ
xˆ
xˆ
xˆ
xˆ
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 3.3 Summary 
 Table 3.1 summarizes the comparative static analysis of the two-mode model. 
Rather than discuss all of these results, we emphasize those that are important for the em-
pirical analysis to follow. Since our main goal is to explain how transport subsidies affect 
urban sprawl, we concentrate on 
1α∂
∂x and
2α∂
∂x .  
 Recall that iα is the ith mode’s private cost share. Since ,0
1
>∂
∂
α
x an increase in 
the subsidized share of Mode 1’s transport cost causes the urban area to contract. This 
result may seem counterintuitive, but when the private share of Mode 1’s variable cost 
decreases, the area for which Mode 1 is cheaper expands (recall that 
221
12ˆ
tt
ffx αα −
−= , so 
0
ˆ
1
<∂
∂
α
x ). The people who originally located between the old, smaller  and new, larger 
 now use Mode 1. Since Mode 1 has a higher variable cost than Mode 2, they are moti-
vated to relocate closer to the CBD because their income net of transport cost increases 
more rapidly with Mode 1 than with Mode 2. Their move closer to the CBD reduces 
housing price in the area between  and 
xˆ
xˆ
xˆ x , which in turn decreases urban land rent and 
structural density while increasing housing consumption. As a result, the urban area 
shrinks. 
 Since 0
2
<∂
∂
α
x
, the urban area expands if the subsidized portion of Mode 2’s 
cost increases. This result is more appealing intuitively and happens because when the 
private share of Mode 2’s variable cost decreases, the area in which Mode 1’s transporta-
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 tion cost is lower than Mode 2’s shrinks.  Those people located between the old, larger  
and new, smaller  use Mode 2 rather than Mode 1, which makes living farther from the 
CBD desirable since the increase in transport costs associated with a move farther out is 
now less. As a result, housing price, urban land rent and structural density in the area de-
crease, while per-household housing consumption increases. For the people located be-
tween the new  and urban area boundary, a decrease in the private share of Mode 2’s 
variable commuting cost increases income net of transportation costs, which raises hous-
ing price, urban land rent, and structural density in the area. Because of the increase in 
urban land rent, the urban area expands spatially.  
xˆ
xˆ
xˆ
  Table 3.1 
  Comparative Static Results of Two-Mode Model 
Endogenous Variable Exogenous 
Variable u x  Si ri pi qi β  
L - + + + + - ? 
)(1 xxf = - + + + + - ? 
)(2 xxf =  - - ? ? ? ? ? 
( )1t x x=  - + + + + - ? 
( )2t x x=  - - ? ? ? ? ? 
 ( )y x x=  + ? ? ? ? + ? 
Ar  - - + + + - - 
x NC NC - - - + NC 
( )1 x xα =  - + + + + - ? 
( )2 x xα =  - - ? ? ? ? ? 
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  CHAPTER 4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 Although there have been many empirical studies of urban sprawl (see, for exam-
ple, the citations in Nechyba and Walsh (2004)), the one closest in spirit and approach to 
ours is Brueckner and Fansler (1983). Consequently, we provide a brief review of that 
paper. 
 Brueckner and Fansler (1983) base their empirical analysis on the theoretical 
model exposited by Brueckner (1987). That model is similar to, but simpler than, ours: it 
has only one transportation mode, no variables representing transportation subsidies, and 
no balanced budget equation. 
 They estimate the following general relationship 
 1 2( , , , , )AArea f L r y t t=   (4.1) 
where Area is the land area in square miles of forty urbanized areas in 1970, L is 1970 
urbanized-area population,  is the 1969 median agricultural land value per acre for the 
county in which the urbanized area is located, y is 1970 urbanized-area mean household 
income,  is the percentage of urbanized-area commuters using bus transit in 1970, and 
is the percentage of 1970 urbanized-area households owning one or more autos. 
Ar
1t
2t
 Equation (4.1) is essentially the reduced-form urban-rural boundary equation from 
the theoretical model, ( , , , , , )Ax x L t y i r δ= , where x  is the urban-area radius, which is of 
course directly related to Area. The two transportation variables are proxies for round-trip 
transport cost per mile. Brueckner and Fansler believe that  and transport cost should be 1t
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 positively correlated because bus travel has a high time cost relative to auto travel, 
whereas and transport cost should be negatively correlated because auto travel involves 
less time cost than bus travel. The variables for structure cost, i, and radians of urban land 
used for residences, δ, are suppressed. 
2t
 Since functional forms are not specified by the theory, the authors estimate a lin-
ear equation by ordinary least squares (OLS) and a flexible form using the Box-Cox 
transformation. The results of both estimation techniques are qualitatively the same. The 
estimated coefficients on population and income are statistically significantly positive, 
while the estimated coefficient on agricultural land rent is statistically significantly nega-
tive. The transportation cost proxies have the correct signs but are not statistically signifi-
cant. The coefficient of determination is approximately 0.80 for both estimated equations.  
Brueckner and Fansler do not discuss potential endogeneity problems arising from the 
transportation-cost variables; we shall return to this topic in our empirical analysis. 
 The authors conclude that sprawl is the result of an orderly market process, that 
transferring farmland to urban use is not a waste, and that the empirical robustness of the 
theory increases confidence in the closed-city model as a policy tool.  We turn now to our 
own empirical work. 
4.1 Objectives and Hypotheses 
 The objective of this thesis is to explore the effect of transportation subsidies on 
urban sprawl. The theoretical model of Ch. 3 predicts that highway subsidies promote 
urban sprawl, while public transit subsidies retard it. Although these are the primary hy-
potheses of interest, we also test other hypotheses of the theory. 
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 We start with OLS and flexible-form procedures, as did Brueckner and Fansler.  
We also investigate endogeneity, which requires us to estimate the model using two-stage 
least square (2SLS). Some of the variables in our model are the same as those used by 
Brueckner and Fansler, and some are different. In addition, we sometimes measure the 
same variables in different ways from those of Brueckner and Fansler. We use what we 
think are more accurate measures of modal commuting costs, and we add new variables 
for highway subsidies, transit subsidies, and the local “income tax” rate. 
4.2 Data Sources  
 We draw all of the basic data used in our empirical work from the web sites of 
various organizations. From the U.S. Bureau of the Census, we have drawn data from the 
population census of 2000; the censuses of government of 1992, 1997, and 2002; and the 
census of agriculture of 1997 and 2002. From the Federal Highway Administration 
(FHWA), we use Highway Statistics 2000. From the Federal Transit Administration 
(FTA), we use the National Transit Database (NTD). From the Insurance Information In-
stitute, we use data on average expenditures for auto insurance. 
4.2.1. United States Census 2000 
 United States Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF3) (U.S. Census Bureau 2000) 
provides number of households, population, household income, and spatial size of urban-
ized areas. SF3 contains some of the richest and most complete statistical data available 
on U.S. residents, collected from one in six households in the United States. There are 
813 detailed tables available in the SF3 data products. The total number of household by 
urbanized area is from Table H1. Mean household income by urbanized area is derived 
from Table P54 and Table H1. 
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4.2.2. Census of Agriculture 
 The United States Department of Agriculture conducts a census of agriculture 
every five year. We obtain rural land rent from the censuses of agriculture for 1997 and 
2002 (National Agricultural Statistics Service 1999, 2004). 
4.2.3. Census of Government 
 The U.S. Census Bureau conducts censuses of government every five years.  
These censuses cover three major subjects: government organization, public employment, 
and government finances. We calculate highway subsidies from information on highway 
expenditures and revenues of counties in which urbanized areas are located. We detail 
this procedure in Section 4.3 below. We also derive the property tax rate using data pro-
vided by the census of government. 
4.2.4. National Transit Database  
 We calculate two variables from the NTD (Federal Transit Administration 2004):  
transit cost per passenger-mile and transit subsidy per passenger-mile. The FTA collects 
and disseminates data on the state of mass transportation via the NTD program. Over 600 
of the nation's transportation providers submit data to the NTD annually. Although the 
NTD reports data on twelve mass transportation modes, we focus on bus because most 
urbanized areas provide bus service, while very few provide other kinds of transit service. 
We define the transit subsidy as the difference between transit operating and capital ex-
penses and transit fare revenues, expressed per passenger-mile. We explain how we esti-
mate this variable later. 
 
 
 4.2.5 Highway Statistics  
 The FHWA annually publishes Highway Statistics, which contains data on motor 
fuel, motor vehicles, driver licensing, highway-user taxation, state and local government 
highway finance, highway mileage, and federal aid for highways. States submit the 
highway data, and the FHA reports the data at the state level. We use Highway Statistics 
2000 (Federal Highway Administration 2003) to calculate motor fuel taxes per vehicle-
mile traveled (VMT) as a proxy for highway cost. We provide details of this procedure in 
section 4.3.7. 
4.2.6. Insurance Information Institute 
 The Insurance Information Institute publishes data on average expenditures for 
auto insurance in 2000 by state (Insurance Information Institute 2005). We use these data 
as part of fixed auto cost. 
4.3 Variables Used in the Analysis 
 This section discusses each variable used in the analysis. Our two-mode theoreti-
cal model produces the following reduced form equation 
  ( )1 1 2 2, , , , , , ,Ax f L y r t tα α θ=   (4.2) 
where x  is the urban boundary, measured by distance from the CBD; L is population; y is 
income per household;  is rural land rent at the urban boundary;  is transit cost per 
round-trip mile;
ar 1t
1α is transit subsidy per round-trip mile (please note that in Ch. 3, 1α  is 
used to represent the private share of transit cost per round-trip mile);  is highway cost 
per round- trip mile; 
2t
2α  is highway subsidy per round-trip mile (in Ch. 3, 2α  is used to 
represent the private share of auto cost per round-trip mile); and θ  is the local “income” 
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 tax rate. Following Brueckner and Fansler, we suppress the structural input rental rate, i, 
in (4.2) because the most likely proxy for it, the interest rate, does not vary much nation-
wide.  Again, following Brueckner and Fansler, we also suppress the variable for radians 
of urban land used for residences. This variable theoretically affects the size of the urban 
area, but it is very difficult to get data on it. 
 Of the various kinds of urban areas the census delineates—including legal cities, 
census designated places, urban clusters, urbanized areas, metropolitan statistical areas, 
primary metropolitan statistical areas, and consolidated metropolitan statistical areas—it 
is the opinion of urban economists that urbanized areas best conform to the generic urban 
area used for theoretical analysis. 
 Many urbanized area have more than one central city. For example, the Tampa 
Bay area has three: Tampa, St. Petersburg, and Clearwater. Since our model is monocen-
tric, we eliminate those urbanized areas with more than one central city. In addition, there 
are sometimes more than one urbanized areas in a single county. In these cases, we are 
concerned that our proxy for rural land value at the urban fringe may be inflated by the 
presence of another nearby urbanized area. There are a total of 465 urbanized areas de-
lineated by the 2000 census. Using GIS software, we identify 201 urbanized areas that are 
located within a single county and have only one central city. This set of urbanized areas 
constitutes our sample. We turn now to a detailed discussion of our variables. 
4.3.1 The Urban Boundary, x  
 Theoretically, the dependent variable in our estimating equation should be the ra-
dius of an urban area with the CBD as the center. To avoid having to calculate an implied 
radius for each of our sample urbanized area, we use instead the spatial size of the urban-
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ized area, which is, of course, directly related to the implied radius. The 2000 census of 
population provides the spatial sizes of urbanized areas, measured in square meters, 
which we convert to square miles. This variable is found in Census 2000(U.S. Census 
Bureau 2002)  
4.3.2. Total Number of Households in Urban Area, L 
 In our theoretical models, we assume single-person households, which is, of 
course, not the case in reality. Since the household is the basic unit of analysis in our 
models, we use households, rather than population, to measure L in our model. This vari-
able is found in U.S. Census 2000, Table P15 (U.S. Census Bureau 2002). 
4.3.3. Mean Household Income, y 
 The U.S. Census 2000 reports median household income in 1999 dollars by ur-
banized area, but not mean household income. The census does, however, report aggre-
gate household income in 1999 dollars in Table P54. We calculate mean income per 
household by dividing aggregate household income by the total number of households 
residing in the urbanized area. 
4.3.4. Agricultural Land Rent, ra 
 In our theoretical models, agricultural land rent is the land rent immediately adja-
cent to the built-up part of the urban area. This theoretical construct is not available em-
pirically in any published source of which we are aware. As an alternative, we use mean 
estimated market value of farmland per acre for the county in which the urbanized area is 
located. This variable is available from the Census of Agriculture (National Agricultural 
Statistics Service, 1999, 2004). Since the Census of Agriculture is conducted every five 
years and in different years from the decennial census, our variable is the mean of the 
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means reported for 1997 and 2002. We perform this calculation to obtain a value for the 
rural land variable as consistent as possible with other variables, most of which are for 
the year 2000. 
4.3.5 Fixed Transit Cost, f1  
 Fixed transit cost includes travel time between home and bus stop and waiting 
time at the bus stop. Since there are no data by urbanized area on travel time to and wait-
ing time at bus stops, we use as a proxy the percentage of the working-age population 
taking transit to work. We expect this proxy to be negatively related to fixed transit cost. 
 Brueckner and Fansler (1983) use the percentage of urbanized-area commuters 
using bus transit as a proxy for their single-mode variable transport cost. They reason that 
the percentage of commuters using transit should be positively correlated with variable 
transport cost because bus has a high time cost. This argument is not supported by travel-
behavior studies, however. 
 Studies of travel behavior find that transit passengers find waiting time to be more 
onerous than in-vehicle travel time (Federal Transit Administration 2004). We argue 
therefore that the longer the waiting time, the less attractive transit becomes as a means of 
transportation, and the fewer users it will attract. Our view is further supported by a Flor-
ida Department of Transportation report on factors affecting transit use (Hinebaugh and 
Zhao 1999)).  The report says that transit use deteriorates exponentially with walking dis-
tance to transit stops. In addition, Nationwide Personal Transportation Studies (U.S. De-
partment of Transportation 1986) reports that the maximum convenient walking distance 
is about 450 meters. We conclude that the longer the walking time, the fewer the people 
who use transit. Data on the percentage of the working age population taking transit to 
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work are from U.S Census 2000 Table P32. Another potential proxy we may use is the 
transit density, defined as the land area covered by each bus route mile. It is expected to 
be positively related to the fixed transit cost. The larger the land area is served by each 
bus route mile, the longer the waiting time, thus higher fixed transit cost. We use data 
from National Transit Database to derive the transit density. Its effect, however, is not 
statistically significant. 
4.3.6. Variable Transit Cost, t1 
 In our two-mode model, private transit cost is the household’s money cost of tran-
sit per round-trip mile. Since no direct measure of this cost exists, we use a close substi-
tute: private transit cost per passenger-mile. This variable is derived by dividing annual 
bus fare revenue by the annual total passenger-miles reported in the National Transit Da-
tabase. 
 The National Transit Database 2002 data tables (Federal Transit Administration, 
2004) provide detailed summaries of financial and operating data submitted to the FTA 
by the nation’s mass transit agencies. For the 2002 report year, 613 transit agencies sub-
mitted data. The FTA has established a uniform system of accounts and records, as well 
as a reporting system for the collection and dissemination of public mass transportation 
financial and operating data by uniform categories. Additionally, according to federal 
law, all applicants and direct beneficiaries of federal assistance are subject to the report-
ing system and the uniform system of accounts and records. Therefore, data reported in 
the NTD are uniform, consistent, comparative, and reliable. 
 We use these data for the year 2002 rather than 2000 for a couple of reasons.  
First, since 2002 the FTA has required reporting of fare revenues by mode. Before 2002, 
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transit agencies reported only an aggregate fare revenue for all the modes they operated, 
which makes it impossible to identify the exact amount of fare revenue generated by a 
particular mode and makes the data less comparable if the modes operated by different 
transit agencies are different. Second, 2002 was the first year that transit agencies were 
required to report performance indicators, such as unlinked passenger trips and passen-
ger-miles by mode. These data enable us to obtain fare revenue per passenger-mile by 
mode. Third, we compare the transit revenues and transit expenses from 2000 to 2002 
and find that the amounts reported are very close, which justifies using 2002 data. 
 The NTD program collects data on eighteen modes, including railroad, cable car, 
demand response (i.e., taxi), commuter rail, ferryboat, heavy rail, inclined plane, jitney, 
light rail, bus, monorail, and trolleybus. Of the 536 transit agencies that report fare reve-
nues, 456 provide bus service, 432 provide demand-response service, forty-five provide 
vanpools, twenty-four provide light rail service, and seventeen provide ferryboat service. 
Other modes have less than fifteen providers. Since bus service is widely provided and 
demand response is generally not considered public transit, we use bus to represent transit 
in our analysis. Based on the transit agency address, we match the transit agencies and 
the urbanized area for which they provide service. We then derive private transit cost per 
passenger-mile from fare revenue and passenger-miles. 
4.3.7 Transit Subsidy, α1  
 In our theoretical model, α1 is used to represent the private share of transit cost. In 
this empirical analysis, we useα1 to represent the transit subsidy. We derive transit sub-
sidy per passenger-mile as follows. First, we sum bus transit operating cost (from Table 
1, NTD 2002) and transit capital cost (from Table 7, NTD 2002) to get total cost. Second, 
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we subtract fare revenue from total cost to get the subsidy. Finally, we divide the subsidy 
by total passenger miles to get transit subsidy per passenger-mile. 
4.3.8. Fixed Auto Cost, f2 
 Fixed auto cost includes all costs invariant to distance traveled. For highway us-
ers, fixed costs generally include registration fees, license fees, motor vehicle taxes, auto 
insurance premiums, maintenance, and depreciation. Since data on maintenance and de-
preciation are not available, we use the sum of average annual motor vehicle fees and 
taxes and annual auto insurance premiums per household to represent fixed auto cost. 
Data on average annual motor vehicle fees and taxes are from Highway Statistics 2000, 
and data on annual auto insurance premiums are from the Insurance Information Institute. 
4.3.9 Variable Auto Cost, t2
 In the two-mode model, variable auto cost is the household’s auto expenditure per 
round-trip mile. No direct measure of this cost exists, and this is the most difficult vari-
able for which to develop a proxy. After consulting many sources, we conclude there is 
no way to get an accurate estimate of this cost by urbanized area. Consequently, we use 
highway fuel tax per VMT to represent private variable highway cost. 
 To help justify the use of this variable, we summarize problems with alternative 
measures. The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ annual consumer expenditure survey reports 
consumer units’ annual expenditures on transportation, including vehicle purchase, gaso-
line and oil purchase, other related expenditures, and expenditures on public transporta-
tion. (A consumer unit comprises: (1) all members of a particular household who are re-
lated by blood, marriage, adoption, or other legal arrangement; (2) a person living alone 
or sharing a household with others or living as a roomer in a private home or lodging 
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house or in permanent living quarters in a hotel or motel, but who is financially inde-
pendent; or (3) two or more persons living together who use their income to make joint 
expenditure decisions.) Financial independence is determined by the three major expense 
categories: housing, food, and other living expenses (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2000).  
This seems an ideal source of data with which to construct variable auto cost. Unfortu-
nately, the consumer expenditure survey reports only the average transportation expendi-
tures for four major regions (Midwestern, Northeastern, South, and Western) and the 
twenty-eight largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas. We considered using the public use 
micro-data files from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to calculate average highway expen-
ditures by urbanized area or by county or MSA in which our sample urbanized areas are 
contained. This approach was precluded by the fact that the geographical location of the 
consumer units is suppressed or recoded to preserve confidentiality. Thus, it is impossible 
for us to obtain the desired transport cost. 
 The only available proxy for the variable we want to measure is average highway 
motor fuel taxes per VMT. Other things equal, the higher the motor fuel taxes paid, the 
higher are variable auto costs. 
 Before we explain how we obtain motor fuel taxes per VMT, which is the largest 
component of highway user-fees by urbanized area (Federal Highway Administration, 
2003), we explain what highway user-fees are and how they are collected and appor-
tioned. These fees play a key role in highway financing in the United States. Highway 
user-fees consist of highway-based exercise taxes; federal use tax and taxes on tires, 
trucks, and trailers; and vehicle-related license and operation taxes. The three major cate-
gories of highway taxes are federal motor fuel taxes, state motor fuel taxes, and local mo-
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tor fuel taxes. Vehicle-related license and operation taxes are generally collected at the 
state and local level (Federal Highway Administration 2003). 
 Federal motor fuel taxes are specific taxes that differ by type of fuel. These taxes 
are not paid directly by highway users to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Rather, 
most taxes are collected by the IRS from several large corporations, typically large oil 
companies or distributors with storage facilities. This makes it impossible to measure fuel 
usage within each state. Therefore, there is no direct measure of highway taxes paid by 
the residents in each state. 
 After the IRS collects highway-based excise taxes, the Office of Tax Analysis es-
timates monthly highway receipts from each state. The Financial Management Service 
and the Bureau of Public Debt then credit the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) with the esti-
mated revenue. Each quarter, the IRS certifies total receipts to reflect actual tax revenue 
collected by type of tax. The Financial Management Service and the Bureau of Public 
Debt then adjust the amount initially estimated based on the IRS’s quarterly verification.  
The final information from the Department of Treasury, which documents receipts for the 
previous fiscal year, determines the overall level of highway user tax receipts attributed 
to the HTF by tax type. This amount represents the total highway program funds avail-
able for apportionment to each state. Among many criteria, state-reported motor fuel data 
are a critical component of the process that distributes HTF to the states (Federal High-
way Administration 2003, 2005). 
 States, however, have very different tax legislation, tax forms, and administrative 
procedures. There are significant variations among the states in exemptions or refunds for 
off-highway use or government use. Therefore, it is not sufficient for the FHWA to sim-
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ply sum up the total gallons of fuel reported by states and use those data for attribution.  
The FHWA has to adjust the data reported by states and separate the data into use (on-
highway versus off-highway), fuel type (gasoline, gasohol, special fuels), and tax statutes 
based on public, private, and commercial categories (exempted, refunded, taxed-at-other-
rate). As a final step, the FHWA sums up the on-highway gallons to derive a national to-
tal for each of the three motor fuel types and divides each state’s gallons by the total gal-
lons to derive each state’s share (Federal Highway Administration 2003). 
 Highway users not only pay federal motor fuel taxes but also state motor fuel 
taxes. State motor fuel tax rates on gasoline vary from 7.5 cents per gallon in Georgia to 
29.3 cents per gallon in New York State, with a national average of 20.17 cents in 2000 
(Federal Highway Administration 2003). Based on state laws, state governments have 
authority to collect motor license fees, registration fees, and other motor-related taxes.  
Revenues from state motor fuel taxes and motor-related fees and taxes are generally used 
by state governments for transportation purposes and are therefore counted as a part of 
user-fees. 
 In some states, due to population growth and inflation in the early 1960’s and 
1970’s, new demands placed on local governments were greater than their ability to raise 
capital for local transportation projects. Therefore, in the early 1970’s, several states al-
lowed counties to “piggyback,” or add to, the state’s tax on highway fuels. For example, 
the Florida legislature authorizes counties to collect up to 12 cents per gallon gasoline tax 
to be used on local transportation projects (Florida Department of Transportation 2005). 
The majority of states, however, do not allow local governments to collect motor fuel 
taxes. 
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 Since highway users pay three layers of fuel taxes, we add them to obtain the total 
fuel taxes paid in each state. We derive the urbanized area’s share of fuel taxes by multi-
plying the amount of total state fuel taxes by the urbanized area’s proportion of its state’s 
vehicles, calculated as the number of vehicles owned by urbanized-area residents divided 
by the total number of vehicles owned by state residents. Since states vary significantly 
regarding the tax exemption for public use or government use, we use the total number of 
privately owned vehicles in each state. 
 After obtaining a figure for annual fuel taxes by urbanized area, we divide that 
figure by annual total VMT, thus deriving highway fuel taxes per VMT, which represents 
variable auto cost in our empirical work. The annual VMT by urbanized area is derived 
by multiplying average daily VMT by 365. To get a per-vehicle figure for each urbanized 
area, we divide the sum of each state’s share of federal motor fuel tax receipts, state mo-
tor fuel tax receipts, and local motor fuel tax receipts by the annual VMT. 
 Federal motor fuel taxes attributed to each state are from Highway Statistics 2000, 
Table FE-9. Data on state motor fuels taxes and related receipts and state motor vehicle 
and motor carrier tax receipts are from Table MF-1 and Table MV-2. Data on local motor 
fuels tax receipts are from Table LDF. Data on the total number of vehicles by state and 
urbanized area are from U.S. Census 2000, Table H46. Data on VMT by urbanized area 
are from Highway Statistics 2000 Table HM72. 
4.3.10 Highway Subsidy, α2
 In our theoretical model, we use α2 to represent the private share of auto cost. In 
this empirical analysis, we use the same notation to represent the highway subsidy. We 
present our method for measuring the highway subsidy by urbanized area in this section. 
  118
One question must be answered before we discuss how we measure the highway subsidy: 
What are highway subsidies or what constitute highway subsidies? 
 There is no official definition of highway subsidies. If user-fees collected for 
highway purposes are not sufficient to cover highway expenditures, governments must 
use other revenues to make up the difference, which amounts to subsidization. According 
to Highway Statistics 2000, total U.S. highway user-fees were $106 billion in 2000, of 
which $81.0 billion was used for highway purposes (Federal Highway Administration 
2003). Total U.S. highway expenditures in 2000 were $127.5 billion. Therefore, the sub-
sidy was $46.5 billion, which was contributed by all levels of government from other 
revenue sources. Revenues contributing to the subsidy are from a number of sources, in-
cluding local property taxes and assessments, other dedicated taxes, general funds, bond 
issues, and other investment income. 
 As shown in Table 4.1, the degree to which highway programs are funded by 
highway-user-fees differs widely among different levels of government. At the federal 
level, 95.6 percent of highway revenues came from motor-fuel and motor vehicle taxes in 
2000. The remainder came from general fund appropriations, timber sales, lease of Fed-
eral lands, oil and mineral royalties, and motor carrier fines and penalties. Highway user-
fees provided 75.5 percent of highway revenues at the state level in 2000. Bond issue 
proceeds were another significant source of funding, providing 12.3 percent of highway 
funds at the state level. The remaining 14 percent of state highway funding came from 
general fund appropriations, other state taxes and fees, investment income, and other 
miscellaneous revenue sources (Federal Highway Administration 2003). 
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 Many states do not permit local governments to impose motor-fuel and motor ve-
hicle taxes, or they cap them at relatively low levels. At the local government level, only 
7.5 percent of highway funding was provided by highway user-fees in 2000. Local gen-
eral funds, property taxes, and other taxes and fees were the sources of 67.5 percent of 
local highway funding. Bond issue proceeds provided 9.8 percent of local highway fund-
ing, while investment income and miscellaneous receipts provided the remaining 14 per-
cent (Federal Highway Administration 2003). 
 Since only 62.9 percent of revenue sources for highways come from highway 
user-fees, highway use is clearly subsidized. The question is how to use this information 
to form the highway subsidy variable in our model. 
 For consistency with our theoretical model, highway subsidies should be meas-
ured per round-trip mile per household for travel within an urban area. (Although the 
model assumes single-person households, we use per-household figures, rather than per-
person figures, because the household is assumed to be the decision maker and the bearer 
of travel costs.) Highway subsidies are the difference between highway expenditures paid 
by various level of governments in a given urban area and the total user-fees collected 
from highway users in that same area. Such a measure of highway subsidies is unavail-
able because of complicated highway ownership and financing systems in the United 
States. 
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  Table 4.1 
  Revenue Sources for Highways, 2000 (billions of dollars) 
Governments 
Revenues 
and 
Expenditures Federal State Local All 
Percent of
Total 
Revenue 
User Charges 
Motor-Fuel Taxes $25.1 $28.7 $1.0 $54.8 42.5
Motor-Vehicle Taxes and Fees $4.6 $15.5 $0.7 $20.8 16.2
Tolls $0.0 $4.7 $0.7 $5.4 4.2
Subtotal $29.7 $49.0 $2.3 $81.0 62.9
Other Sources of Revenue 
Property Taxes and Assessments $0.0 $0.0 $6.4 $6.4 4.9
General Fund Appropriations $1.2 $4.1 $11.9 $17.2 13.4
Other Taxes and Fees $0.1 $2.4 $2.8 $5.4 4.2
Investment Income & Other Receipts $0.0 $2.7 $4.8 $7.5 5.8
Bond Issue Proceeds $0.0 $8.2 $3.1 $11.2 8.7
Subtotal $1.4 $17.5 $28.9 $47.7 37.1
Total Revenues $31.1 $66.4 $31.3 $128.7 100.0
Total Expenditures $27.7 $67.0 $32.7 $127.5 99.0
 Source: Federal Highway Administration, 2003, Table HF-10 
 
 Highways are typically classified by either ownership or purpose. Ownership is 
determined by the jurisdiction that has primary responsibility for a particular structure, 
while purpose (as well as level of service) is identified from the structure’s function.  
Ownership is divided among federal, state, and local governments. According to the De-
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partment of Transportation, roads and bridges owned by these governments are consid-
ered public, while structures owned privately are commonly considered nonpublic. States 
own almost 20 percent of the nation’s road system. The federal government has control 
over about 3 percent of the network. Over 77 percent of American roads are locally 
owned although some intergovernmental agreements may authorize states to construct 
and maintain locally owned highways. 
 Highway financing is not solely determined by highway ownership, however.  
Highways owned by the federal government (including interstate highways; the strategic 
highway network, which is generally highways important to military mobilization; other 
rural and urban principal arterials; strategic highway network connectors; and intermodal 
connectors) are 90-percent funded by the federal government. For highways owned by 
states, capital outlays are largely funded by the federal government through intergovern-
mental grants. Even local roads are not funded solely by local governments. State and 
federal governments fund the majority of capital outlays for local roads (Federal High-
way Administration 2002). 
 According to Highway Statistics 2000, although the federal government funded 
$27.7 billion (21.7 percent) of total highway expenditures, the majority of the federal 
government’s contribution to highways consisted of grants to state and local govern-
ments. Direct federal spending on capital outlay, maintenance, administration, and re-
search amounted to only $2.3 billion (1.8 percent). The remaining $25.4 billion was in 
the form of transfers to state and local governments. State governments combined $24.4 
billion of federal funds with $52.1 billion of state funds and $1.3 billion of local funds to 
make direct expenditures of $77.9 billion (61.1 percent). Local governments combined 
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$1.0 billion of federal funds with $14.9 billion of state funds and $31.4 billion of local 
funds to make direct expenditures of $47.3 billion. 
 Given the complicated highway ownership and funding systems, it is almost im-
possible to obtain an accurate estimate of highway subsidies by urbanized area. For ex-
ample, in a particular urbanized area, urban residents may have access to interstate high-
ways owned and mainly funded by the federal government but maintained by the state 
government, state-owned highways funded by the state, highways owned by counties or 
cities maintained and funded by the state, and county or city roads owned and funded by 
them. For the various roads within an urbanized area, local governments report only 
revenues and expenditures on the roads owned and funded by them. No financing data 
are available for those roads not owned or funded by local governments. We are therefore 
restricted to use county and city data to calculate highway subsidies for a given urban 
area. Unfortunately, city data are not reliable because most highway revenue data are not 
reported. We are therefore reduced to using only county data to calculate highway subsi-
dies. 
 The highway subsidy variable used in our analysis is derived as follows. First, we 
obtain county highway subsidies as the difference between total county highway expendi-
tures and total county highway revenues. The urbanized area’s share of highway subsi-
dies is calculated as the product of total county subsidies and the number of vehicles 
owned by urbanized-area residents divided by the number of vehicles owned by county 
residents. The urbanized area’s share of highway subsidies then is divided by urbanized-
area VMT to derive the highway subsidies per VMT. If major construction occurred in a 
particular year, highway expenditures and related subsidies in that year may have risen 
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substantially. To smooth this kind of effect, we use a three-year average for 1992, 1997, 
and 2002. All the three-year data are adjusted to 2000 dollars based on the CPI. 
 Our data are provided by censuses of government. The census of government col-
lects detailed data on government financing every five years. We use their data for the 
survey year 1997 and 2002. Highway-related expenditures and revenues are reported by 
county. According to the census of government, highway expenditures include expendi-
tures on maintenance, operation, repair, and construction of non-toll highways, streets, 
roads, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, and related structures, while highway revenues include 
revenues from motor fuel taxes, motor vehicle license fees, motor vehicle operation fees, 
transfers from state government and federal governments, and regular charges on high-
ways (U.S Census Bureau 2004). 
4.3.11 Local Property Tax Rate, θ 
 The local property tax rate is derived from information provided by the census of 
government. We deflate 1997 and 2002 county and city property tax revenues to 2000 
dollars by the CPI. To derive the per-household property tax payment, we average the 
property tax figures and divide by the number of urbanized-area households. Then the 
per-household property tax payment is divided by mean household income to derive the 
local property tax rate. Although the urbanized areas in our model are smaller than the 
counties in which they are located, this should not introduce much error since the high 
value property is located predominantly in the urbanized areas. 
4.3.12 Intergovernmental Grants, G 
 The variable intergovernmental grants is derived from information provided by  
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the census of government. We deflate 1997 and 2002 county and city intergovernmental 
grants for transportation purposes from state government and derive the average inter-
governmental grants by urbanized area. 
4.3.13 Missing Observations  
 In this empirical analysis, 201 urbanized areas meet our criteria that the urbanized 
area be located within a single county and have only one central city. Because of missing 
observations, however, we end up with 93 urbanized areas. Almost all the incomplete ob-
servations are due to the absence of two key variables, the transit subsidy and the high-
way subsidy. Although it is fairly common for a data set to have gaps for a variety of rea-
sons, it is nevertheless important to ensure as well as possible that these missing observa-
tions do not cause problems in the empirical analysis. 
 In general, there are two cases to consider, depending on why the data are miss-
ing. One is that the data are simply unavailable and not systematically related to other 
observations in the sample. This case is called ignorable (Greene 2000) because the ana-
lyst may simply ignore the problem without reducing the statistical reliability of the esti-
mated results. Were the missing data available and not used, there would of course be a 
loss of efficiency. 
 The second case involves missing data that are systematically related to other 
variables in the model. This case occurs most often in surveys in which the data are self-
selected. This case causes a more serious problem because the gaps in the data set repre-
sent, not only missing information, but also information that, if available, could change 
the estimated results. All our incomplete observations are due to the absence of data on 
two key variables, the transit subsidy and the highway subsidy. The transit subsidy is 
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missing for some urbanized areas because they simply have no public transit. This situa-
tion is not related to self-selection or non-response error. Because of the non-existence of 
public transit in 96 urbanized areas, our sample size falls from 201 to 107. Because of 
non-existence of VMT by urbanized area, our final sample is 93. A list of variables, defi-
nition of the variables in the empirical analysis, and their data sources are presented in 
Table 4.2. Table 4.3 provides summary statistics. 
Table 4.2 
 
List of Variables, Definitions, and Data Sources 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Area Spatial size of the urbanized area in square miles Census 2000 
L Number of households by urbanized area  Census 2000  
ra
Estimated market value of farmland per acre 
for the county in which the urbanized area is 
located  
Census of Agricultural 
1997, 2002 
y Mean household income by urbanized area Census 2000 
f1 Percentage of working age population using 
transit Census 2000 
f2
Sum of auto annual insurance premium, reg-
istration fee, license fee, and motor vehicle 
tax per household by urbanized area   
Highway Statistics 
2000, Insurance Infor-
mation Institute 
t1 Bus fare cost per passenger-mile  National Transit Data-
base 2002 
t2
Fuel tax payment per vehicle-mile traveled Highway Statistics 
2000 
α1 Subsides to bus service per passenger mile National Transit Data-base 2002 
α2 County subsidies to auto use per vehicle mile traveled 
Census of Government 
1997, 2002 
G Intergovernmental Transfer from State to lo-
cal governments for transportation purposes 
Census of Government 
1997, 2002 
θ Local income tax rate: percentage of average household income paid as property tax pay-
ment  
Census of Government 
1997, 2002 
  
   Table 4.3 
  Summary Statistics 
Variable Unit Mean Std. Error Minimum Maximum 
Area Sq. mi. 85.7978 75.01 13.6256 323.556 
L 1000  79.839 92.85 17.87 518.61 
ra $1000 2.176 1.143 0.28 5.87 
y $1000 49.43 8.036 31.38 92.86 
f1 Percentage 1.83 1.54 0.35 7.61 
f2 $1000 1.275 0.203 0.9909 1.747 
t1 Cent 15.755 10.406 1.65 75.05 
t2 Cent 3.449 1.006 1.73 6.64 
α1 Cent 112.6 80.69 17.26 430.6 
α2 Cent 0.4004 0.3327 0.0071 1.7215 
G $1000 20379.5 58908.34 0.9572 500000 
θ Percentage 1.642 0.6516 0.43 3.28 
 
4.4 Model Specification and Estimation 
4.4.1 Functional Form 
 We estimate the following equation: 
 
2
0 1 2 3 4 5 1 6 1 7
2
8 2 9 2 10 2 11 2 12 13
ln AArea L r y y f t
f t G
1β β β β β β β β α
β β β α β α β θ β ε
= + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + +       (4.3) 
We adopt this particular form for the following reasons. Following the method presented 
in Wooldridge (2003, pp. 208) in order to obtain a  goodness-of-fit measure for the log 
model that can be compared with the R-squared from the level model, we find that the 
semi-log model explains more of the variation in the spatial size of urbanized areas than 
does the linear model. We therefore prefer the semi-log model on goodness-of-fit 
 126
  127
grounds. We also choose the semi-log model because, except for the intercept, each esti-
mated coefficient is the proportional change in the dependent variable per unit change in 
the independent variable and is, therefore, independent of the units in which the variables 
are measured.  We then conduct specification tests that are embedded in STATA, the 
software we use to run the regression.  An added-value plot reveals that there are signifi-
cant nonlinearities in the data for income and the auto subsidy.  We therefore, add two 
quadratic terms for these variables.  This is further justified by the Lagrange multiplier 
test for adding variables. The chi-square value obtained by running regression of the re-
siduals of the restricted model on all explanatory variables is 27.44, exceeding the 1 per-
cent critical value of 9.21 for 2 degrees of freedom, which indicates that we should reject 
the restricted model. 
4.4.2 Potential Endogeneity Issue 
 In our two-mode model, all the independent variables in (4.3) are theoretically 
exogenous because the equation is a reduced form. Econometrically, however, a variable 
on the right-hand side of (4.3) may be endogenous if it is correlated with the error term.  
If such a case or cases exist, OLS will produce inconsistent estimates. Our empirical 
model, following from the theoretical model, focuses on what we regard as the most im-
portant forces determining the spatial size of an urban area. We have not included all pos-
sible factors that may affect urban sprawl, and one of these omitted variables may give 
rise to endogeneity in one or more of the included variables. A potential candidate for 
endogeneity is variable highway cost, which measures the per-mile cost of driving to the 
CBD. Endogeneity could result from unobserved or unmeasured heterogeneity, which 
would occur if highway variable cost were correlated with any of the unmeasured spatial 
  128
size determinants that are buried in the error term. One of the unmeasured spatial size de-
terminants could be congestion. 
 Although we do not believe congestion plays an important role in determining the 
spatial size of an urban area (Altmann and DeSalvo, 1981, find that it does not in their 
urban simulation model), it may be related to variable highway cost. For example, when 
congestion is severe, stop-and-go driving results in inefficient fuel usage, which causes 
higher variable highway cost. If this were the case, the resulting coefficient estimates in 
(4.3) would suffer from omitted-variable bias. This bias cannot be eliminated because the 
omitted variable or variables representing congestion are, by definition, not in our data 
set. If congestion is important and is not held constant in the regression, the coefficient on 
highway variable cost would be biased down, and we would therefore underestimate its 
effect on urban sprawl. 
 When potential endogeneity is involved, researchers generally use two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) to correct the problem and obtain consistent and unbiased estimates. To 
serve this purpose, researchers introduce instrumental variables (IV’s) into the regression.  
The IV for an endogenous explanatory variable must satisfy two properties: (1) it must be 
uncorrelated with the error term of the structural equation (although in theory our esti-
mated equation is a reduced form equation, here, because of the potential endogeneity, 
we refer to it as a structural equation); and (2) it must be correlated with the endogenous 
variable. When used properly, 2SLS allows us to estimate ceteris paribus effects in the 
presence of endogenous explanatory variables. When the instrumental variable and the 
endogenous explanatory variable are only weakly or even moderately correlated, how-
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ever, IV estimates can have large standard errors or even a large asymptotic bias, which 
means 2SLS can be worse than OLS. 
 In our empirical analysis, we use two instrumental variables for the potential en-
dogenous highway variable cost, state gas tax per gallon and urbanized-area freeway 
lane-miles. To satisfy the conditions for suitable instruments, state gas tax per gallon and 
freeway lane-miles must not affect the spatial size of the urbanized area in any way other 
than through the impact of these variables on highway variable cost per mile. In other 
words, these variables must be correlated with highway variable cost but not with the 
second-stage residuals. To determine if these conditions hold, we must investigate the 
processes that determine interstate differences in gas taxes and inter-urbanized-area dif-
ferences in freeway lane-miles and evaluate whether the determinants of these variable 
have direct effects on the spatial size of an urbanized area. 
 State gas taxes are set within a complex system of institutional relationships de-
signed to plan, finance, and operate the nation’s highways. According to Dunn (1998), 
the system has two important components, intergovernmental transfers and the highway 
trust fund. Intergovernmental transfers ensure federal funds are funneled to the states that 
are responsible for construction and maintenance of highways. The highway trust fund 
ensures that the majority of revenues from federal and state gas taxes are dedicated to 
highway infrastructure needs. As discussed in 4.3.7, the federal government pays for 90 
percent of interstate highway construction costs and over 50 percent of capital outlays for 
non-interstate highway construction. States are responsible for the construction and main-
tenance of highways owned by the federal government. The states raise funds for their 
share of highway costs through state gas taxes and other fuel taxes. The majority of states 
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have exclusive dedication provisions that protect gas tax revenues from general use other 
than highway financing, as shown by the fact that twenty-eight states have gas-tax ear-
marking provisions in either the state constitution or state law, while eleven states com-
mit receipts to special-purpose funds to finance highway projects. 
 A state’s gas tax is determined by the state’s matching obligation for the construc-
tion of federally funded highway projects and the financing of state-initiated projects. In 
most states, revenues collected from state gas taxes are separated from state general 
funds. Combining that fact with the exclusive dedication provisions existing in most 
states, it seems reasonable to argue that the principal determinants of state taxes are 
highway project financing and the availability of federal funds. It is therefore reasonable 
to believe that the process determining the state gas tax is independent of the spatial size 
of the urbanized area.  Thus, we may argue that state gas tax per gallon is a suitable in-
strument for highway variable cost. 
 To the best of our knowledge, there is no literature directly analyzing inter-
urbanized-area differences in freeway lane-miles. Among roadway types, freeways pro-
vide the highest level of mobility at the highest speed for long, uninterrupted travel.  
They generally have higher design standards than other highways, often with multiple 
lanes and a high degree of access control. Freeways comprise interstate highways and 
other expressways with fully controlled access. 
 Highway functional classification is the grouping of roads, streets, and highways 
into systems of similar characteristics based primarily on the length of trips served. Addi-
tionally, functional classification defines the role that a particular road or street plays in 
serving the flow of trips through a highway network and analyzes the services provided 
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or that should be provided by each highway facility in serving the two principal functions 
of a highway, mobility and access. Two nationwide studies of highway functional classi-
fication were conducted during the period 1969–1971. The first study required the func-
tional classification of existing (1968) highways, while the second study used the same 
functional classes and basic functional criteria as the first study, but provided for the clas-
sification to be based on projected 1990 facilities and usage. The Federal-Aid Highway 
Act of 1973 required the use of functional highway classification to update and modify 
the federal-aid highway systems by July 1, 1976 (Federal Highway Administration 2003). 
This legislative requirement is still in effect and the National Highway Functional Classi-
fication System has been in use since that time. 
 From the perspective of history, the most important use of functional classifica-
tion has been to identify those streets and roads that are eligible for federal funds. The 
Federal-Aid Highway Acts specifically mandated nationwide studies in cooperation with 
states and local governments to bring greater consistency to highway classifications and 
to classify all public streets and highways according to their function. According to the 
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, interstate highways and other expressways with ac-
cess fully controlled are in high priority to receive federal funds. Therefore it is reason-
able to believe that the location and lane-miles of freeways are determined by federal 
fund availability. From an engineering perspective, freeway capacity is generally set 
equivalent to engineering capacity because the through movement is the only concern for 
those highways while other roads’ capacity is not only based on engineering capacity but 
also other factors such as population density and accessibility to major activities centers.  
Combined with the fact that the highway functional identification was done in 1970s, it is 
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reasonable to believe that freeway lane-miles are unlikely to be correlated with the unob-
servable determinants of the spatial size of urbanized area. This is confirmed by the 
change in freeway lane-miles over time. We analyze data from Highway Statistics on the 
freeway lane-miles for urbanized area. We find that from 1992–2002, at the national 
level, 33.7 percent of urbanized areas’ freeway lane-miles decreased, 41.3 percent in-
creased at an annual rate of less than 1 percent, and 26 percent increased at an annual rate 
of 2 percent or higher. 
 For the urbanized areas in our data set, 73 percent of freeway lane-miles either 
decreased or remained unchanged, while 37 percent increased, most at an annual rate of 
less than 3 percent. These facts support the argument that freeway lane-miles within an 
urbanized area are pure functional classification and unlikely to correlate with the unob-
served determinants of the urbanized area’s spatial size. 
 The data for these instrumental variables are from Highway Statistics 2000. Data 
on total freeway miles and state gas taxes are from also from Highway Statistics 2000, 
Table HW71 and Table MF-121T, respectively.  
4.4.3 Empirical Results 
 In this subsection, we discuss the results of our estimation of (4.3). We confine 
our discussion to the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients and to the con-
formity of our estimated results with our theoretical expectations. In Ch. 5, we discuss the 
economic significance of our findings for urban sprawl. 
 Table 4.4 presents the OLS results and the second-stage parameters from the 
2SLS estimation. The first-stage variable highway cost regression results are presented in 
Table 4.5. In the 2SLS estimation, we incorporate the explanatory variables discussed in 
 Section 4.2 and use the interstate variation in gas taxes and inter-urbanized-area freeway 
lane-miles as instruments. Comparing the estimated coefficients from the OLS and 2SLS 
regressions, we find the magnitudes of most are similar and the signs are the same. We 
conduct a Hausman specification test and find that we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the differences in coefficients are not systematic. The results are therefore materially un-
affected by the endogeneity correction, so we discuss only the OLS regression.  
  Table 4.4 
  OLS and 2SLS Regression Results 
OLS 2SLS 
Variable 
Coefficient Std. Error p Coefficient Std. Error p 
L 0.0077 0.0006 0.000 0.0075 0.0006 0.000
ra -0.0041 0.0338 0.905 -0.0115 0.0351 0.743
y 0.1187 0.0271 0.000 0.1153 0.0277 0.000
y2 -0.0011 0.0002 0.000 -0.0011 0.0002 0.000
f1 -0.0956 0.0266 0.001 -0.0927 0.0271 0.002
t1 0.0068 0.0039 0.084 0.0058 0.0041 0.162
α1 -0.0010 0.0005 0.052 -0.0009 0.0005 0.067
f2 -0.2936 0.1953 0.137 -0.3375 0.2027 0.100
t2 -0.0690 0.0381 0.074 -0.1278 0.0687 0.067
α2 0.6431 0.3575 0.076 0.6968 0.3666 0.061
α 22 -0.6589 0.2893 0.025 -0.6783 0.2943 0.024
θ -0.1224 0.0588 0.041 -0.1156 0.0601 0.058
G -4.18e-7 1.00e-06 0.677 -1.88e-7 1.04e-6 0.857
Constant 1.3520 1.7300 
R2 0.8161 0.8105 
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  The coefficient on L, the number of households, is positive, as predicted, and sta-
tistically significant at the 1-percent level.  
 The coefficient on agricultural land rent, ra, is negative, as predicted by our 
model, and is statistically insignificant. The statistical insignificance may be due to two 
factors. The mean estimated market value of rural land in a county may in fact do a poor 
job of capturing actual rural land value at the urban fringe. Brueckner and Fansler (1983) 
allow for this possibility by restricting their sample to urbanized areas in “small” coun-
ties, and their estimated coefficient is statistically significant. The statistical insignifi-
cance of our variable may also result from its small range of variation in our sample, 
which prevents the emergence of a precise estimate. 
 The estimated coefficients on y and y2, income and income squared, are statisti-
cally significant at the 1-percent level, and their signs indicate that the spatial size of the 
urbanized area increases at a decreasing rate with income. In the estimated equation, the 
marginal effect of income on urban size is given by 
 3 4
ln 2Area y
y
β β∂ = +∂  
where 3  and 4β β  and are the estimated coefficients on y and y2, respectively. For the es-
timated coefficients and the mean urbanized-area income of $49,430, the result is posi-
tive, which is in line with the prediction of the standard single-mode model, as well as 
ours. When income is $54,000 or higher, however, our result is negative. Since urban-
area size can increase, remain unchanged, or decrease with urban-area mean income, the 
effect of income on urban spatial size is, in general, ambiguous, which is what is pre-
dicted by our two-mode model.  
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 The effect of income on urban size has generated considerable discussion in the 
urban economics literature, so we devote some time to how our findings comport with the 
findings in the literature. In partial equilibrium urban models that include the value of 
time spent commuting, the ambiguity of income’s effect on location has been known 
since Muth (1969), and the empirical results find the effect variously positive or negative 
(e.g., Muth, 1969, Wheaton, 1977, Hekman, 1980, DeSalvo, 1985). The result depends 
on the relative magnitude of the income (or wage-rate) elasticity of housing demand and 
the income elasticity of marginal (distance) commuting cost (first noted by Muth (1969)). 
If the former is greater than, equal to, or less than the latter, then, as income increases, the 
household locates farther from, at the same distance from, or closer to the CBD, respec-
tively. Since the value of time spent commuting rises with income (Hensher, 1976) , it is 
possible that at incomes above $54,000 households choose to live closer to the CBD than 
they would at lower incomes. Thus, urbanized areas with mean household incomes 
greater than $54,000 might well be smaller than urban areas with smaller mean incomes. 
 Partial equilibrium urban models and empirical tests of them generally not do in-
clude mode choice. DeSalvo and Huq (2005) introduce mode choice into the partial equi-
librium urban model and find that the wage-rate elasticity of marginal commuting cost 
varies with the wage rate in a complicated way. The effect of the wage rate on location 
can generate a wide variety of possibilities, including our empirical result. Although a 
few general equilibrium models include mode choice (e.g., Anas and Moses, 1979), we 
are unaware of general equilibrium urban models that include the value of time spent 
commuting. 
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 In our two-mode model, if public transit’s fixed cost, variable cost, or private cost 
share increases, the urban area expands, whereas the opposite is the case for auto com-
muting. In our empirical work, the percentage of people using transit is the proxy for 
fixed transit cost, f1. The estimated coefficient on f1 is statistically significant at the 1-
percent level, and its negative sign is consistent with our theoretical expectation. The co-
efficient on transit variable cost, t1, is positive, as expected, and statistically significant at 
the 8-percent level. The coefficient on the transit subsidy variable, α1, is negative, as pre-
dicted, and statistically significant at the 5-percent level, suggesting that the higher the 
transit subsidy, the smaller is the urbanized area. Another potential proxy variable for the 
fixed transit cost is transit density, which is derived as the land area of the urbanized ar-
eas divided by the total bus services miles. When we use this proxy in our regression, we 
find it to be insignificant.  
 The coefficient of fixed auto cost, f2, is negative, as predicted, but not statistically 
significant. Our measure of fixed auto cost, which is composed only of the auto insurance 
premium and motor vehicle taxes, may fail to capture the behavior of actual auto fixed 
cost because we do not have data on auto maintenance and depreciation. The coefficient 
on variable auto cost, t2, is negative, as predicted, and statistically significant at better 
than the 1-percent level. This means that if auto commuting cost increases, people will 
move closer to the CBD, thereby reducing the size of the urbanized area. 
 We use a quadratic polynomial to capture the nonlinearity of the highway sub-
sidy, α2. The coefficient on highway subsidy and highway subsidy squared are statisti-
cally significant at the 8-percent level and 3-percent level, respectively. The coefficient 
on highway subsidy is positive, while that on highway subsidy squared is negative, in-
 dicting that the spatial size of the urbanized area is increasing at a decreasing rate with 
the highway subsidy.  The marginal effect of the highway subsidy is: 
 10 11 2
2
ln 2Area β β αα
∂ = +∂  
where 10β and 11β  are the estimated coefficients on 2α  and 22α  respectively. If we insert 
the estimated coefficients and the mean value of the highway subsidy of 0.4 cents per ve-
hicle-mile traveled, the result is positive, which is consistent with our prediction that the 
higher the highway subsidy, the larger is the urbanized area. When the highway subsidies 
exceed 0.4880 cent per VMT, however, our result is negative. The overall effect of high-
way subsidies on the urban size is not consistent with our theoretical prediction. This may 
be due to the fact that our highway subsidy variable only includes subsidies from the 
county where the urbanized area is located, which fails to capture the subsidies from the 
cities. It may also be because our highway subsidy variable is not an accurate measure-
ment because, given current data availability, there is no way to figure out exact highway 
subsidies by urbanized area. 
 The coefficient on the property tax rate, θ, is negative, as predicted, and statisti-
cally significant at the 6-percent level. Song and Zenou (2006) also obtain this result in a 
paper dedicated to determining the effect of the property tax on urban sprawl. 
 The coefficient on the intergovernmental grant for highway purposes, G, is nega-
tive but not statistically significant. Our model predicts that the relationship between ur-
ban size and the intergovernmental grant is ambiguous. 
 Before turning to the 2SLS estimates, a brief discussion of the results from the 
first-stage regression reported in Table 4.4 is in order. It is clear that state gas taxes exert 
 137
  138
a positive effect on variable auto cost, while freeway lane-miles exert a negative effect. 
Both instruments are independently significant at the 0.001-level. The F-statistic for the 
test of the joint significance of the two instruments is 18.56. Hence, the instruments are 
strongly correlated with highway variable cost.  
 Returning to the results in Table 4.3, the 2SLS coefficient estimates on all vari-
ables except auto variable costs are quite close to the estimates from OLS. OLS underes-
timates the effect of auto variable costs: the coefficient on auto variable costs is –0.069, 
compared to –0.128 using 2SLS. Nevertheless, both sets of results largely support our 
theoretical predictions. Since we use two instrumental variables, we are able to perform a 
test of the over-identifying restriction. The test fails to reject the over-identification re-
striction, suggesting that the dependent variables’ effects on urban size are not sensitive 
to the choice of instruments. 
4.4.4 Summary  
 This chapter presents the data and econometric issues in estimating our two-mode 
model. The discussion of our empirical findings focuses on the statistical significance of 
estimated coefficients and on the conformity to our of our empirical results with the two-
mode theoretical model. Based on our theory, the variables explaining the spatial size of 
an urban area are the number of households, rural land value, household income, fixed 
and variable costs of public transit and auto travel, subsidies to public transit and auto 
travel, property taxes, and intergovernmental grants. We find that the spatial size of the 
urbanized area shrinks with an increase in the transit subsidy. The effect of highway sub-
sidies, however, is ambiguous. Both OLS and 2SLS are applied, and the results are quali-
tatively the same. 
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  Table 4.5 
  First-Stage Results from Regression of Auto Variable Costs on IV’s 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error p 
L 0.0086 0.003 0.010 
ra -0.2002 0.0840 0.020 
y -0.0359 0.0617 0.562 
y2 0.0003 0.0005 0.489 
f1 -0.0091 0.0665 0.892 
f2      -0.0006 0.0005 0.226 
t1 -0.0169 0.0095 0.079 
α1 0.0005 0.001 0.694 
α2 0.9379 0.8864 0.293 
α22 -0.3611 0.7177 0.616 
Freeway Lane Miles -0.0067 0.0018 0.000 
State Gas Tax Rate 0.1083 0.0246 0.000 
G -2.37e-06 2.76e-06 0.393 
θ -0.0175 0.1477 0.906 
R2 0.43
N 93
F (Joint Significance of IV) 18.56
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  CHAPTER 5 POLICIES TO CONTROL URBAN SPRAWL 
 In Ch. 4, we presented the econometric results of estimating (4.3) and discussed 
how these results conform to our two-mode theoretical model’s predications. In this 
chapter, we asses the economic significance of our findings and relate them to the issue 
of urban sprawl. 
5.1 The Sensitivity of Urban Spatial Size to Our Explanatory Variables 
 To get a sense of the sensitivity of sprawl to our explanatory variables, we calcu-
late elasticities of the urban area’s spatial size with respect to the individual explanatory 
variables, and we calculate their individual effects on the spatial size of the urban area 
due to a 1-percent change in the variable (all evaluated at the means of the data). These 
calculations are shown in Table 5.1. We show results only for those explanatory variables 
whose coefficients are statistically significant at least the 10-percent level. On this crite-
rion, we omit rural land value, ra, auto fixed cost, f2, and intergovernmental grants, G. 
 Perhaps the first thing to notice in Table 5.1 is that the spatial size of the urban 
area is not very sensitive to any single explanatory variable: all elasticities are numeri-
cally less than one. The largest in magnitude is the elasticity of area with respect to num-
ber of households, L, so that a 1-percent increase in the number of households, which is 
about 800 households, produces an approximately 0.6-percent increase in the spatial size 
of an urban area. This increases the size of the urban area by about 0.5 square miles, or 
about 0.4 acres per household, which is slightly larger than the average residential lot size 
of one-third acre. The next largest is the income elasticity of about 0.5. A 1-percent in-
 crease in income, y, which is about $500, produces an expansion of the mean urban area 
of 0.4 square miles. 
  Table 5.1 
  Elasticities and Area Change 
  (Due to 1-Percent Change in Explanatory Variables) 
 
Variable Elasticity
Area Change
(sq. mi.) 
L 0.615 0.53
y 0.492 0.42
f1 –0.175 –0.15
t1 0.107 0.09
1α  –0.113 –0.10
t2 –0.238 –0.20
2α  0.046 0.04
θ  –0.201 –0.17
. 
 Variables affecting public transit use have relatively small effects on the spatial 
size of urban areas. A 1-percent increase in the percentage of commuters using public 
transit, which is an increase of about 0.02 percent, reduces the urban area by about 0.2 
percent, or by about 0.2 square miles. The percentage of commuters using public transit 
is a proxy for our theoretical variable, and we expect it to be inversely related to the the-
ory’s transit fixed cost variable. Therefore, an increase in transit fixed cost increases ur-
ban-area size, which is consistent with our theory. A 1-percent increase in public transit 
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 cost per passenger-mile, which is about 0.01 cent and is our proxy for transit variable 
cost, increases urban-area size by about 0.1 percent, or by slightly less than 0.1 square 
miles. Finally, a 1-percent increase in the transit subsidy per passenger-mile, 1α , which is 
about $0.01, reduces urban-area size by about 0.1 percent, or about 0.1 square mile. 
 Variables affecting auto usage also have small effects on urban-area size. A 1-
percent increase, an increase of about 0.03 cents, in highway fuel taxes per VMT, our 
proxy for variable auto cost, produces a reduction in urban-area size of about 0.2 percent, 
or about 0.2 square miles. A 1-percent increase in county highway subsidies per VMT, an 
increase of about 0.004 cents, increases urban-area size by about 0.05 percent, or about 
0.04 square miles. 
 Finally, a 1-percent increase in household property tax paid as a percentage of 
household income, our proxy for the urban-area “income” tax, which is about 0.02 per-
cent, produces 0.2 percent decrease in urban-area size, or about 0.2 square miles. 
 One conclusion from the above is that the most powerful “policy” variable is the 
number of urban households. Policy makers can control this variable directly, through 
urban population constraints, or indirectly through land-use controls. The other policy 
variables are those affecting the cost of transportation. As we have seen, their effects are 
relatively small. 
 Although the individual effects of changes in policy variables are small, joint 
changes in those variables would produce a larger effect.  To see how large an effect, we 
change all of the policy variables by 1 percent in the appropriate direction. Before pro-
ceeding to this exercise, we note that the proxy for fixed transit cost, namely, the percent-
age of working-age population using transit for commuting, cannot be changed directly 
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by policy action. Rather, it will change due to changes in other variables, such as transit 
variable cost and transit subsidy, so we omit that variable from our list. The remaining 
variables we treat as policy variables are transit variable cost and subsidy, auto fixed and 
variable costs and subsidy, and the property tax rate.  Of these, policy should decrease 
transit variable cost and the auto subsidy while increasing transit subsidy, auto fixed cost, 
auto variable cost, and the property tax rate to produce a reduction in urban-area spatial 
size. 
 If we change these variables by 1 percent in the appropriate direction, the urban 
area decreases in size by about 0.8 percent, or 0.7 square mile. This is still a modest 
change, slightly larger than a 1 percent decrease in the number of households in the urban 
area. 
5.2 Conclusion on Effect of Policy-Relevant Variables on Urban Sprawl 
 Although our intent was to determine the effect of transport subsidies on urban 
sprawl, our empirical analysis suggests that the spatial size of the urbanized area is not 
very responsive to any single policy-relevant variable in our model, which we have de-
fined as variable transit cost, transit subsidy, fixed and variable auto cost, auto subsidy, 
and property taxes. Even used together and for small changes, namely, 1-percernt in-
creases or decreases, their effect on urban sprawl is small. 
 Since this thesis focuses on the effect of transportation subsides on urban sprawl, 
we emphasize the transportation policies or practices that may be effective in curbing 
sprawl. Our empirical analysis provides evidence that the spatial size of an urbanized area 
is negatively related to the transit subsidy and the percentage of the working-age popula-
  144
tion using transit and positively related to transit cost. This suggests that improving tran-
sit use may help curb urban sprawl but that the effect may be small. 
            Transit ridership is influenced by a variety factors, both internal and external to 
the transit system. Internal factors refer to those under the control of transit agencies, 
such as the level of service provided, fare structures and levels, service frequency and 
schedules, route design, and size of service area. External factors, on the other hand, are 
those outside the transit agency’s control, such as population and employment growth, 
residential and workplace location, and factors that affect the relative attractiveness of 
transit to other modes, such as gas price and parking costs (Mineta Transportation Insti-
tute 1991).  
 One disadvantage of public transit use is its high time cost, including both collec-
tion and distribution cost and line-haul cost. Transit agencies or transportation authorities 
may reduce transit collection and distribution costs by adding additional routes, expand-
ing coverage, increasing service frequency, and operating longer hours. They may reduce 
line-haul costs by busways, queue-jumping lanes, and intersection signal controls that 
give priority to public transit.  
 Our empirical analysis finds that transit cost and urban spatial size are positively 
related. This suggests that reducing transit cost may be another way to improve transit 
ridership, which may help curb urban sprawl, but, again, the effect is likely to be small. A 
deep discount fare program is a good way to reduce transit cost. Such policies generally 
offer a per-ride discount for purchase of a multi-ride pass or transit card, aiming to attract 
potential riders of low usage or high price-sensitivity. Parking price can be an effective 
means of increasing transit use for work trips. Since increasing parking costs increases 
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the relative attractiveness of transit as compared to auto, its effect on transit modal choice 
is significant. A higher gas price is expected to have the same impact on transit use. 
 Our empirical analysis suggests that auto costs are negatively related to the spatial 
size of urban area. Increasing auto costs also helps reduce auto subsidies, which are ex-
pected to contribute to urban expansions although our empirical analysis indicates that 
the spatial size of an urbanized areas increases at a decreasing rate with increase in auto 
subsidies. 
 The federal government can indirectly influence the cost of auto use by removing 
subsidies and tax benefits to oil and gasoline production. State governments may use road 
pricing to increase auto cost. Road pricing means that highway users pay directly for 
driving on a particular road or in a particular area. State governments may also change 
motor carrier regulations and vehicle insurance regulations to increase the cost of auto 
use. Local governments can offer local transportation demand management programs and 
allow more flexible zoning requirements to reduce auto use (Victoria Transport Policy 
Institute 2005). 
5.3 Further Research 
 There are three extensions of the preceding models that we would like to pursue. 
Specifically, these are (1) including value of travel time, (2) endogenizing congestion, 
and (3) generalizing mode choice. Only very brief discussions of these extensions are 
provided. 
5.3.1 Value of Time 
 To deal satisfactorily with the value of transportation time, it is necessary to in-
troduce time elements explicitly into the utility function, the budget constraint, and a time 
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constraint. A partial equilibrium model of this type has been worked out by DeSalvo 
(1985). We intend to develop a general equilibrium model of this sort. 
5.3.2 Endogenizing Congestion 
 Congestion is absent from the models discussed above, but congestion affects 
commuting cost. The first formulations of a general equilibrium urban spatial model in-
corporating endogenous congestion were those of Mills (1972) and Solow (1972, 1973). 
Muth (1975) also included congestion in his simulation model. In addition, simulation 
models (e.g., Muth (1975)) use a congestion function that expresses time cost of travel as 
a function of traffic density. Henderson (1985) discusses three ways to model congested 
systems: current demand dependent on past and future travel conditions, current travel 
speeds dependent on past and future conditions, and the traditional model (a static version 
of the first and second ways).  Since most urban models with congestion use the 
Mills/Solow framework (Ross and Yinger, 2000), we intend to use the same framework 
for expositional simplicity. 
5.3.3 Generalizing Mode Choice 
 Mode choice in our approach is determined by where a traveler lives and is de-
pendent on only two parameters, fixed and variable transportation cost. We plan to use 
the more general approach proposed by DeSalvo and Huq (2005). This approach is simi-
lar to the "abstract mode" approach proposed many years ago by Quandt and Baumol 
(1966), in which a mode is defined by its characteristics. This approach has the advantage 
of being able to deal with past, present, and future modes, as well as mode combinations, 
rather than being restricted to modes currently in use.
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